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Cybersecurity remains a threat to all enterprises, and this Article contributes
to the corporate governance literature, particularly as it applies to mergers and
acquisitions and the management of cyber liability risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Yahoo! Inc. ("Yahoo" or the "Company") announced on
September 22, 2016, that a state-sponsored hacker had breached the
Company's digital systems in 2014 and had stolen personal
information from over 500 million user accounts.' The information
stolen likely included names, birthdays, telephone numbers, email
addresses, "hashed passwords (the vast majority with bcrypt), and, in
some cases, encrypted or unencrypted security questions and
answers."2 At the time it was announced, this 2014 theft represented
the largest data breach ever.' This record would only later be
surpassed by another Yahoo breach: a 2013 breach affecting 1 billion
user accounts that the Company announced in December 2016.'
Yahoo further disclosed its belief that the stolen data "did not include
unprotected passwords, payment card data, or bank account
information."' Just two months before Yahoo disclosed its 2014 data
breach, it announced a proposed sale of the Company's core business
to Verizon Communications, Inc. ("Verizon").' During mid-
1. An Important Message to Yahoo Users on Security, YAHOO! INC. (Sept. 22, 2016)
[hereinafter Yahoo Press Release], https://finance.yahoo.com/news/important-
message-yahoo-users-security-182800027.html.
2. Id.
3. See Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-
hackers.html.
4. See Robert McMillan, Ryan Knutson & Deepa Seetharaman, Yahoo Discloses
New Breach of 1 Billion User Accounts, WAU ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2016, 5:19 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-discloses-new-breach-of-1-billion-user-accounts-
1481753131.
5. Yahoo Press Release, supra note 1.
6. See Verizon to Acquire Yahoo's Operating Business, PR NEWSWIRE (July 25, 2016,
7:00 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/verizon-to-acquire-yahoos-
operating-business-300303133.htm. Verizon emerged from the historic 1998 merger
between Bell Atlantic Corp. and GTE Corp. on June 30, 2000. VERIZON, THE HISToRY
OF VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS 1 (2016), http://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default
/files/VerizonHistory_0916.pdf. With approximately 177,700 employees and
annual revenues exceeding $131 billion, Verizon is now one of the world's leading
communications providers. VERIZON, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 2,. 10 (2016),
https://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/annual/verizon-annual-2015/
downloads/15_vzar.pdf. Verizon Wireless, a Verizon subsidiary and the largest
wireless service provider in the United States, has 112.1 million retail connections
and accounts for approximately 70% of Verizon's total revenues. Verizon
Communications, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 2-3 (Feb. 23, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/732712/000119312516473367/d35513d
10k.htm#tx35513_1. With 100% ownership over Verizon Wireless, Verizon is able to
reach 98% of the U.S. population, equal to approximately 312 million Americans.
VERIZON, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra, at 10, 11.
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December 2016, Yahoo announced that another 1 billion customer
accounts had been compromised during 2013, establishing a new
record for the largest data breach ever.
Almost all corporations-from technology companies like Yahoo to
brick-and-mortar sales companies that use electronic commerce
services-face a significant risk from data breaches, and mergers and
acquisitions may result in cyber liability and vulnerabilities for the
acquirer.' This announced acquisition raises a number of important
corporate governance issues: whether Yahoo breached its duty to
provide data security, its duty to monitor, its duty to disclose, or some
combination thereof; the impact on Verizon shareholders of a
renegotiated deal for the two companies to share the cost of liability;
and whether more severe and wide-ranging compensation clawbacks
would be appropriate.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses corporate
governance and the director's duty of care, including the duty to
secure data and the duties to monitor and disclose. Part II presents a
brief description of Yahoo; outlines Verizon's proposed acquisition;
describes the Yahoo data breaches and their known impact to date;
and looks at Yahoo's executive compensation, code of ethics, and duty
to disclose material events. Part III examines the important corporate
governance issues raised by the proposed Yahoo/Verizon transaction.
The Article concludes with some thoughts on the evolution of
corporate liability as it relates to data security and what the future
may hold for this important and fast-developing area of the law.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE DIRECTOR'S DuTy OF CARE
A. The Duty to Provide Data Security
Corporate directors and officers have a duty to behave reasonably.
This duty of care applies across directors' and officers' myriad
responsibilities, including handling the corporation's digital data.
There is, therefore, an emerging specific application of the duty of
care as related to information technology: the duty to secure data.
The applicable standard of care requires directors "to provide
'reasonable' or 'appropriate' physical, technical, and administrative
7. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH.
L.J. 230, 240 (2016) (discussing the risk assumed by companies that acquired
malware-tainted Nortel software from bankruptcy proceeding); see also Lawrence J.
Trautman & George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC & the Internet: Regulating the Web of
Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 262 (2014) (discussing electronic commerce
operations and websites).
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security measures to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of corporate data."'
There is not, however, a single source-such as a comprehensive
federal statute or regulation-that imposes a duty to provide data
security. Rather, corporate legal obligations to implement data
security systems are "set forth in an ever-expanding patchwork of
state, federal, and international laws, regulations, and enforcement
actions, as well as in common law duties, contractual commitments,
and other expressed and implied obligations to provide 'reasonable'
or 'appropriate' security for corporate data."'
1. Sources of the duty
a. Statutes and regulations
The primary statutory and regulatory sources of corporate data
security obligations are diverse: privacy laws, data security laws,
electronic transaction laws, corporate governance laws, unfair and
deceptive business practice and consumer protection laws, and
breach notification laws.10
There are several federal privacy statutes-paired with
implementing regulations-that require corporations to create and
maintain information security systems to protect specific types of
personal data about individuals. Particularly important examples
include the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999,n which
concerns the financial sector; the Health Insurance Portability and
8. THOMAS J. SMEDINGHOFF, INFORMATION SECURITY LAw: THE EMERGING
STANDARD FOR CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 29 (2008).
9. Id.; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity Oversight: Who's
Who and How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman,
Cybersecurity: What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 U. ILL.J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 341; Lawrence J.
Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations
and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 205 (2013); Lawrence J. Trautman,
Jason Triche & James C. Wetherbe, Corporate Information Technology Governance Under
Fire, 8 J. STRATEGIC & INT'L STUD. 105 (2013).
10. See Thomas J. Smedinghoff, An Overview of Data Security Legal Requirements
for All Business Sectors 4-6 (Oct. 8, 2015) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2671323; see also SMEDINGHOFF,
supra note 8, at 30-31.
11. Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act of 1999
("GLBA"), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). See generally TimothyJ. Yeager, Fred C. Yeager & Ellen
Harshman, The Financial Services Modernization Act: Evolution or Revolution?, 59 J.
ECON. & Bus. 313 (2007).
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Accountability Act of 1996,12 which concerns healthcare information;
the Privacy Act of 1974,13 which establishes governmental record-
keeping requirements; and the Children's Online Privacy Protection
Act," which applies to all businesses that collect personal information
on the Internet from children.
Additionally, several states-including Arkansas, California,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, and
Utah-have enacted data security statutes that impose "a general
obligation on all companies to ensure the security of personal
information."" For example, California, which was the first state to
enact this type of legislation in 2004, requires all businesses to
"implement and maintain reasonable security procedures and
practices" to protect California residents' personal information against
"unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification, or disclosure.
Further, several federal regulations impose a duty to protect specific
types of information, such as IRS revenue procedures requiring
security measures to protect electronic tax records" and SEC
regulations requiring the protection of corporate financial data."
Some electronic transactions laws and implementing regulations
intended to maintain the fidelity, accuracy, and enforceability of
electronic documents also require data security for electronic record-
keeping. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act is the guiding federal statute, whereas the Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act applies at the state level." Both mandate
companies secure electronic records that relate to online
transactions, primarily through requirements concerning the data's
accessibility, integrity, and accuracy.2 0
From a corporate governance perspective, several statutes and
implementing regulations are designed to protect public companies'
shareholders, investors, and business partners. The two chief sources
of authority from which corporate governance data security
12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA"), Pub. L No.
104-191, 110 Stat 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
13. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2012).
14. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-02 (2012).
15. Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 5.
16. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1798.81.5(b) (West 2016); see also Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 5.
17. See Rev. Proc. 97-22, 1997-1 C.B. 652; Rev. Proc. 98-25, 1998-1 C.B. 689.
18. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.17a-4, 248.30 (2015); 17 C.F.R § 257.1(e) (3) (2011).
19. UNw. ELEc. TRANSACTIONs AcT ("UETA") § 7 (UNIF. LAw COMM'N 1999).
20. Sw id. § 12; see also E-SIGN, 15 U.S.C. § 7001 (d)-(e) (2012) (clarifying that statutory
requirements to retain documents or to execute documents in writing are satisfied by
electronic documents so long as the electronic versions are accurate and accessible).
1236 [Vol. 66:1231
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obligations flow are the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 1 and the SEC's 2011
guidance.2 2 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires public companies to
implement appropriate information security controls regarding
companies' financial information.2 ' The SEC's 2011 guidance
identifies risks to cybersecurity as potential material information that
companies must disclose under pre-existing securities law disclosure
requirements and accounting standards.
Among unfair and deceptive business practice and consumer
protection laws, section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act) ,2 associated Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement
actions, and equivalent state statutes are the chief sources for the
imposition of data security obligations. Between 2002 and 2005, the
FTC and equivalent state entities brought cybersecurity-related
enforcement actions premised on a deceptive trade practice theory of
liability: companies were liable for failing to provide adequate
information security, contrary to the representations they made to
consumers.2 ' The parties resolved these actions by entering into
consent decrees wherein corporations agreed to take affirmative steps
to better protect information in their systems.
21. Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
22. Corporate Finance Disclosure Guidance: Topic No. 2: Cybersecurity, DIV. OF CORP. FIN.,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/
corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm [hereinafter SEC CFDisclosure Guidance].
23. Bruce H. Nearon et al., Life After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Merger of Information
Security and Accountability, 45JURIMETRICs 379, 391, 394 (2005).
24. SEC CFDisclosure Guidance, supra note 22 (explaining that federal law requires
a company to disclose particularized risks specific to the company, not boilerplate or
generic risks that could apply to any firm in the industry).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 45.
26. See, e.g., Compl. 11 12-16, In re Guess?, Inc., File No. 022 3260, 2003 WL
21406017 (F.T.C. June 18, 2003) (arguing that it is a deceptive trade practice to
represent to consumers, through a published privacy policy and answers to
"frequently asked questions," that consumer personal information is encrypted when
a commonly used method of cyberattack could obtain this information in clear,
unencrypted text); Compl. 11 12-14, In re MTS, Inc., 032-3209, 2004 WL
963226 (F.T.C. Apr. 21,. 2004) (claiming that the failure to use an "authentication
code" in the new ordering system allowed a vulnerability and therefore access to
private consumer information in contravention of the company's published Privacy
Policy, which amounted to a deceptive trade practice).
27. See, e.g., Agreement Containing Consent Order at secs. II, V, In re Guess?,
Inc., File No. 022 3260 (F.T.C. June 18, 2003),
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/06/guessagree.htm (ordering a corporation to implement
safeguards sufficient for its size and complexity by designating employees to work on
cyber security, conducting a risk assessment, tailoring safeguards to any
particularized risks discovered, and changing business practices to conform with the
1237
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But after 2005, the FTC significantly broadened the scope of its
cybersecurity-related enforcement actions by contending that a
company's failure to provide appropriate data security for consumers'
personal information was, alone, an unfair trade practice; that is, a
company could be liable without ever having misrepresented the extent
of its data security practices to consumers." Subsequently, in August
2015, the Third Circuit ratified the FTC's broader theory of liability.'
To date, forty-seven states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands have also enacted cybersecurity breach notification
laws, which impose an obligation to disclose security breaches to those
affected.' Myriad federal banking regulations also impose an obligation
on financial institutions to disclose security breaches.
new information security safeguards); Agreement Containing Consent Order at secs.
II, V, In re MTS, Inc., File No. 032-3209 (F.T.C. Apr. 21, 2004),
www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0323209/040421agree0323209.pdf (same).
28. A Bill to Require Greater Protection for Sensitive Consumer Data and Timely
Notification in Case of Breach: Hearing on Discussion Draft ofH.R. Before the Suhcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 44 (2011)
(statement of Edith Ramirez, Comm'r, FTC) ("[T]he Commission enforces the FTC
Act's proscription against unfair ... acts . .. in cases where a business ['s] .. . failure to
employ reasonable security measures causes or is likely to cause substantial consumer
injury."); The Threat of Data Theft to American Consumers: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Mfg. & Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 15 (2011)
(statement of David Vladeck, Dir., Bureau of Consumer Prot., FTC) (same).
29. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 245-47, 249, 259 (3d
Cir. 2015) (holding that Wyndham's failure to secure consumer information, which
resulted in actual harm to consumers, fell within the plain meaning of "unfair"). See
generally Hillary Brill & Scott Jones, Little Things and Big Challenges: Information Privacy
and the Internet of Things, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 1183, 1209-12 (2017) (describing how the
FTC's section 5 enforcement authority applies to companies' cybersecurity policies).
30. See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORs (Feb. 24, 2017),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/
security-breach-notification-laws.aspx.
31. Supplement A to Appendix B to Part 30-Interagency Guidance on Response
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice,
12 C.F.R § 30 (OCC) (providing guidance to financial institutions about what the
consumer notice of breach should include); Supplement A to Appendix D-2 to Part
208-Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to
Consumer Information and Consumer Notice, 12 C.F.R. § 208 (Federal Reserve
System), Supplement A to Appendix B to Part 364-Interagency Guidance on Response
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice, 12
C.F.R § 364 (FDIC); 12 C.F.R. § 568.5 (Office of Thrift Supervision); see also
Interagency Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Consumer
Information and Consumer Notice, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,736, (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R pts. 30, 208, 225, 364, 568 & 570) (reviewing commentator
feedback on agency proposed guidance for how institutions should respond and notify
consumers following unauthorized access to consumer information).
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b. Federal executive branch action
Federal executive action also serves a function in data security. In
February 2013, President Obama issued an executive order that, in
part, "expanded public-private information sharing and tasked the
[National Institute for Standards and Technology ('NIST')] with
establishing a voluntary 'Cybersecurity Framework' comprised partly
of private-sector best practices that companies could adopt to better
secure critical infrastructure." While there have been critics on
both sides of the new NIST Cybersecurity Framework-some argue it
does not go far enough, while others contend the framework is
hardly "voluntary"-it nonetheless "has the potential to shape a
standard of care for domestic critical infrastructure organizations.""
Not only that, but some commentators are hopeful that, particularly
for corporations like Yahoo that operate across jurisdictions, "a global
standard of cybersecurity care could eventually emerge [organically]
that would promote consistency and contribute to 'cyber peace' even
absent regulatory action."'
On May 11, 2017, President Trump signed an executive order
intended to improve the federal government's cybersecurity and
protect critical infrastructure from digital attacks." The most notable
changes include requiring "heads of federal agencies [to] use a
framework developed by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to assess and manage cyber risk, and prepare a report
within 90 days documenting how they will implement it.""
c. Common law
Scholars and commentators have long contended there is a
common law duty to provide adequate security for corporate data.7
32. Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of Care?
Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping Reasonable
National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 305, 308 (2015).
33. Id. at 308-10.
34. Id. at 311; see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?,
18 N.C.J.L. & TECH. 233, 236 (2016) (hypothesizing a large-scale cyberattack and its
fallout to illustrate the necessity for a global standard for cybersecurity).
35. Dustin Volz, Trump Signs Order Aimed at Upgrading Government Cyber Defenses,
REUTERS (May 11, 2017, 5:11 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-
cyber-idUSKBN1872L9.
36. Id.
37. SMEDINGHOFF, supra note 8, at 31 (citing Kimberly Krefer & Randy V. Sabett,
Openness of Internet Creates Potential for Corporate Information Security Liability, Elec.
Commerce & Law Rep. (BNA), Vol. 7, No. 24, at 594 (June 12, 2002); Alan Charles
Raul et al., Liability for Computer Glitches and Online Security Lapses, Elec. Commerce &
1239
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While at least one court has explicitly held there is no corporate duty
to provide security," several courts have concluded just the opposite.
In 2005, for instance, a state appellate court in Bell v. Michigan Council
25" held that the "defendant did owe plaintiffs a duty to protect them
from identity theft by providing some safeguards to ensure the security
of their most essential confidential identifying information."'
And, more recently, a federal district court held,
Although neither party provided the Court with case law to support
or reject the existence of a legal duty to safeguard a consumer's
confidential information entrusted to a commercial entity, the
Court finds the legal duty well supported by both common sense
and California and Massachusetts law.... As a result, because
Plaintiffs allege that they provided their Personal Information to
Sony as part of a commercial transaction, and that Sony failed to
employ reasonable security measures to protect their Personal
Information, including the utilization of industry-standard
encryption, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a
legal duty and a corresponding breach.
d. Contractual obligations
In situations where third parties have possession of, control over,
or access to corporate data, companies that entrust third parties to
manage their data are increasingly trying to satisfy their duty to
protect the security of their data by contract.4 2 For example, some
companies contract for "cloud computing" services, in which a third
party is charged with storing and processing a company's data.3
Law Rep. (BNA), Vol. 6, No. 31, at 849 (Aug. 8, 2001); Erin Kenneally, The Byte Stops
Here: Duty and Liability for Negligent Internet Security, XVI COMPUTER SECURIY J.
(2000)).
38. Cooney v. Chi. Pub. Schs., 943 N.E.2d 23, 30 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (finding that
the Consumer Fraud Act only restricted "persons" from publicly posting an
individual's private information, and the School Board was not a "person," thus
rejecting an independent duty to safeguard private information).
39. No. 246684, 2005 WL 356306 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 15, 2005) (per curiam).
40. Id. at *5.
41. In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d
942, 966, (S.D. Cal. 2014) (citations omitted); see also Lawrence J. Trautman, The SONY
Data Hack Implications for World Order (unpublished manuscript).
42. Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 8.
43. Id. (adding that, similarly, access to a trading partner's data often comes with
contractual security obligations). A similar example involving multiple parties is the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard ("PCI Standard"). Merchants that
want to accept credit credits at the point of sale must contractually agree to
compliance with the PCI Standard. PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY SEcuRrrY STANDARDS
1240 [Vol. 66:1231
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These contracts shift the data security duty from the contracting
company to the cloud computing company through cyber liability
indemnification provisions.
e. Self-imposed obligations
Finally, companies increasingly impose security obligations on
themselves. As noted above, the FTC has aggressively pursued
deceptive trade practice enforcement actions against companies that
make representations in privacy policies, on websites, or in
advertising materials that are inconsistent with the entity's actual data
security practices."
2. The standard of care for the duty
Of the authorities discussed above that impose a data security duty,
most simply state that there is "an obligation to implement
'reasonable' or 'appropriate' security measures," but they "provide
little or no guidance as to what is required for legal compliance."45
While there is little question that the legal standard for what
constitutes reasonable security is still emerging, much progress has
been made in recent years.
Thomas J. Smedinghoff, a leading expert on this emerging
cybersecurity standard, explains that the emerging digital security
standard is particularized and case specific.46  Unlike prior specific
requirements, such as passwords or firewalls, the new corporate
security obligation is fact-specific, requiring companies to go through
a "process" and determine what security measures are most
appropriate for the company's security needs.7 The emerging legal
standard follows suit by allowing companies to create their own
specific security measures so long as the companies conduct ongoing
reviews of their security mechanisms." This repetitive review process
includes detecting and evaluating risks, implementing specific
security responses to those risks, verifying the effective
COUNCIL, VERSION 3.2, DATA SECURIY STANDARD: REQUIREMENTS AND SEcURTIY
ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 5 (2016); Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 8.
44. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 10 F. Supp. 3d 602, 626 (D.N.J. 2014)
(holding that in light of Wyndham's publication of a privacy policy, in which it
promised to protect consumers' personal information, the failure to implement
corresponding security measures amounted to an unfair practice under the FTC
Act), affd, 799 F.3d 236, 241, 259 (3d Cir. 2015).
45. Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 9.
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implementation of those security responses, and updating the
measures as needed in reaction to developing security concerns.49
Specifically, Mr. Smedinghoff's process-oriented approach to
satisfying a "reasonable" or "appropriate" standard of care for a duty
to provide security is composed of the following seven provisions":
Assign Responsibility: A corporation should expressly designate one
or more employees to be responsible for maintaining the data
security program.
Identify Information Assets- A corporation should identify its
information assets that require protection, which include both the
data itself (i.e., records containing personal information) and the
computing systems that store the personal information (e.g., servers,
laptops, and portable devices).
Conduct Risk Assessment A corporation should perform a risk
assessment to identify both internal and external risks to its data
security, and it should evaluate the effectiveness of the company's
current practices for safeguarding and minimizing the risks identified.
Select and Implement Responsive Security Controls A corporation
should implement physical, administrative, and technical security
controls it considers appropriate to minimize the risks it identified in
its risk assessment.
Monitor Effectiveness- A corporation should regularly monitor, test,
and reassess the security controls it has chosen to implement in order
to ensure its security program is operating in a manner reasonably
calculated to protect personal information. Relatedly, a corporation
should regularly upgrade its security controls as necessary to limit
emerging risks.
Regularly Review the Security Program: A corporation should review
and adjust its data security program no less than once per year. A
corporation should also perform security program reviews whenever
there is a material change in business practices that could affect personal
information or after any incident involving a breach of its data security.
Address Third Party Issues- A corporation should take all reasonable
steps to verify that every third-party service provider that has access to
the company's data assets and personal information has the capacity
to protect that information."
An ever-increasing number of authorities are expressly adopting
this process-oriented approach to data security, which is referred to as
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id.
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a Written Information Security Program ("WISP").52 The ETC is the
most important of the authorities that have adopted the WISP
standard. According to the FTC, businesses in all industries should,
comply with the process-oriented approach to information security as
it demonstrates the "best practice" for legal compliance." The FTC
has demonstrated this view by requiring any company resolving FTC
complaints about failure to provide adequate information security
through consent decrees to implement and comply with this process-
oriented approach." The FTC's adherence to the WISP standard is
particularly important in light of the agency's post-2005 theory of
liability that sanctions a duty to protect data.5
3. The FTC's cybersecurity unfair trade practices theory of liability
As noted briefly above, since 2005, the FTC has pursued
administrative actions against companies "with allegedly deficient
cybersecurity that failed to protect consumer data against hackers"'
under the FTC Act's provision that prohibits "unfair ... acts or
practices in or affecting commerce."5  Commentators have
analogized the jurisprudence that these FTC actions has spawned to
an authoritative body of common law that operates in lieu of
comprehensive cybersecurity legislation." Professors Daniel J. Solove
and Woodrow Hartzog explain,
[A] deeper look at the principles that emerge from FTC privacy
"common law" demonstrates that the FTC's privacy jurisprudence
is quite thick. The FTC has codified certain norms and best
52. See, e.g., 201 MASS. CODE REGs. § 17.03 (2017); HIPAA Security Standards, 45
C.F.R. § 164.308 (2017). See generally Bruce Radke & Michael J. Waters, Selected State
Laws Governing the Safeguarding and Disposing of Personal Information, 31 J. MARSHALLJ.
INFO. TECH. & PRIvAcY L. 487 (2015) (comparing different state WISP regulations).
53. Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 11 (citing Identity Theft: Innovative Solutions for
an Evolving Problem: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Terrorism, Tech. & Homeland Sec. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7, 93 (statement of Lydia Parnes, Dir.,
Bureau of Consumer Prot., FTC)) (remarking that "'the FTC Safeguards Rule
promulgated under the GLB Act serves as a good model' for satisfying the obligation
to maintain reasonable and appropriate security").
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Brad Lunn, Strengthened Director Duties of Care for Cybersecurity Oversight:
Evolving Expectations of Existing Legal Doctrine, 4 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 109, 124, 127
(2014) (describing the duty to protect in the context of the responsibilities of
company director to be informed and actively engaged in cybersecurity issues that
arise in a company).
56. FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1) (2012).
58. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REv. 583, 604-05, 619-20 (2014).
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practices and has developed some baseline privacy protections.
Standards have become so specific they resemble rules. The FTC
has thus developed a surprisingly rich jurisprudence. We contend
that the foundations exist to develop this "common law" into a
robust privacy regulatory regime, one that focuses on consumer
expectations of privacy, extends far beyond privacy policies, and
involves a, full suite of substantive rules that exist independently
from a company's privacy representations.5
An additional contributor to this body of law's scant level of
scholarly analysis is the fact that "[t]he vast majority of [FTC cyber
liability] cases have ended in settlement."' But this may be changing:
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit specifically affirmed
the FTC's theory of liability under the unfairness prong in August
2015." The Third Circuit's FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp. case was
a rare exception where a court opined on the FTC's cybersecurity
liability strategy.62 Because it is inevitable the FTC will bring an
administrative action against Yahoo for the 2014 data breach, a closer
examination of the Third Circuit's decision in Wyndham follows.
In 2008 and 2009, hackers breached Wyndham Worldwide
Corporation's computer systems three times, stealing hundreds of
thousands of customers' personal and financial information, which
resulted in over $10.6 million in fraudulent charges." As a result, the
FTC filed suit in U.S. district court under 15 U.S.C § 45(a), alleging,
inter alia, that Wyndham's failure to provide adequate protection for
private customer information was an unfair trade practice." After the
district court denied Wyndham's motion to dismiss the complaint,
the Third Circuit granted an interlocutory appeal to address
"whether the FTC has authority to regulate cybersecurity under the
unfairness prong of § 45(a); and, if so, whether Wyndham had fair
notice its specific cybersecurity practices could fall short of that
59. Id. at 586.
60. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d at 240.
61. Id. at 240, 247.
62. Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel J. Solove, The FTC as Data Security Regulator: FTC
v. Wyndham and Its Implications, Privacy & Sec. L. Rep. (BNA), Vol. 13, at 621 (Apr.
14, 2014) (explaining that the court's rare opportunity to comment arose because
Wyndham was the first company unwilling to settle the FTC's complaint). For a
decade, the FTC alleged that deficient information security amounted to an unfair
trade practice, and every complaint it filed during this decade settled. Id.
63. Wyndham, 799 F.3d at 240.
64. Id.
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provision.""5 The Third Circuit affirmed the district court and ruled
in the FTC's favor on both questions.'
Addressing the first issue, the Third Circuit reviewed in detail the
FTC Act's legislative history and the FTC's past practices, and it noted
that both flexibility and ambiguity were purposefully built into the
Act." Accordingly, the court dismissed Wyndham's argument that its
cybersecurity practices "[fell] outside the plain meaning of 'unfair.'""
Among other arguments Wyndham raised, it asserted that the
corporation could not treat its customers in an unfair manner when
criminal hackers victimize the corporation too.' The court rejected
the argument, pointedly noting that "[a]lthough unfairness claims
'usually involve actual and completed harms,' they may also be
brought on the basis of likely rather than actual injury,'"70 particularly
because the FTC Act "expressly contemplates the possibility that
conduct can be unfair before actual injury occurs."7i
B. The Duty to Monitor
Among other duties, corporate directors and officers owe the
corporation and its shareholders a duty of care. The duty of care is a
concept adapted from tort law, and it requires an actor to behave
reasonably.72 Director liability for a breach of the duty of care may
arise in two distinct contexts.73  First, liability may "follow from a
board decision that results in a loss because that decision was ill
advised or 'negligent.' 7  Second, liability may "arise from an
unconsidered failure of the board to act in circumstances in which
due attention would, arguably, have prevented the loss."75
65. Id.
66. Id. at 259.
67. Id. at 243 (citing FTC v. Bunte Bros., 312 U.S. 349, 353 (1941) (contrasting
unfair competition with the rather clear-cut problem of rate discrimination)).
68. Id. at 247.
69. Id. at 246.
70. Id. (quoting In re Int'l Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1061 & n.45 (1984)).
71. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) ("[An unfair act or practice] causes or is likely to
cause substantial injury.")).
72. Robert J. Rhee, The Tort Foundation of Duty of Care and Business judgment, 88
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1139, 1159-60 (2013).
73. Seeln re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996).
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing E. Norman Veasey & Julie M.S. Seitz, The Business judgment Rule in
the Revised Model Act, the Trans Union Case, and the ALI Project-A Strange Porridge, 63
TEx. L. REv. 1483 (1985)).
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In In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,7 a seminal
1996 Delaware Chancery Court decision on the duty of care, the
court took pains to emphasize that judicial inquiries into a director's
affirmative actions center on the adequacy of the process that gave rise
to the shareholders' derivative action, not the content of the decision
itself.77 Therefore, a director will not be found liable for a decision
after-the-fact if the decision making process used was in good faith or
rational in promoting the corporation's interest.78 The overwhelming
majority of a director's affirmative acts are evaluated under the
deferential business judgment rule. But the business judgment rule
applies differently in situations where a director's lax oversight-a
failure to monitor and be informed-results in corporate losses.79
At its core, a breach of the duty to monitor arises when "a loss
eventuates not from a decision but, from unconsidered inaction."'
Noting that "[m]ost of the decisions that a corporation, acting through
its human agents, makes are ... not the subject of director attention,"
the Caremark court nonetheless recognized that "ordinary business
decisions that are made by officers and employees deeper in the interior
of the organization can ... vitally affect the welfare of the corporation
and its ability to achieve its various strategic and financial goals.""
At a minimum, corporate boards fail to satisfy their obligation to be
reasonably informed about the corporation if they do not "assur[e]
themselves that information and reporting systems exist in the
organization that are reasonably designed to provide ... timely,
accurate information sufficient to allow management and the
board ... to reach informed judgments concerning ... the
corporation's compliance with law."" This is not to say, however, that
there is a universal, one-size-fits-all solution to the duty to monitor-
"the level of detail that is appropriate for such an information system
is a question of business judgment."" Nor does the existence of an
adequate monitoring system eliminate the risk "that the corporation
will violate laws or regulations, or that senior officers or directors may
76. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
77. Id. at 967.
78. Id. (explaining that applying an "objective" standard during judicial review
would "expose directors to substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or
juries, which would ... be injurious to investor interests").
79. SeeVeasey & Seitz, supra note 75, at 1502.
80. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 970.
83. Id.
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nevertheless sometimes be misled or otherwise fail reasonably to
detect acts material to the corporation's compliance with the law.""
Thus, the duty to monitor requires "the board [to] exercise a good
faith judgment that the corporation's information and reporting system
is in concept and design adequate to assure the board that appropriate
information will come to its attention in a timely manner."" To avoid
liability and conform to relevant legal norms, a director should attempt
in good faith to ensure the company has a "corporate information and
reporting system" that the board finds satisfactory.' Accordingly, the
corporate law duty of care centers on whether corporate directors and
officers employed a "good faith effort" to remain reasonably informed
sufficient to "exercise goodjudgment.""
C. The Duty to Disclose
A publicly traded corporation's duty to disclose the existence of a
data breach stems from at least two distinct authorities: Delaware
state corporate common law and the SEC's 2011 corporate finance
disclosure guidance, which identifies material data security risks that
companies must disclose under securities law disclosure requirements
and accounting standards." Companies that know about a data
breach but fail to disclose it to shareholders, regulators, and
consumers risk liability under potentially corporate, breach
notification, and securities laws.
84. Id.
85. Id. (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 968.
87. Id.; see also William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director
Due Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a
Standard of Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449, 457 & n.31 (2002) (stating that
directors "will not be held liable" for a breach of the duty to monitor without a
finding of bad faith); Christopher M. Bruner, Is the Corporate Director's Duty of Care a
"Fiduciary"Duty? Does It Matter?, 48 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 1027, 1047 (2013) (asserting
that liability under the Caremark standard requires bad intention toward the
company, such as "total board failure to engage in oversight"); Lynn A. Stout, In
Praise of Procedure: An Economic and Behavioral Defense of Smith v. Van Gorkom and the
Business judgment Rule, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 680 (2002) (noting that in some states,
directors are presumed to meet the duty of care if the decision was "informed," and
"unless the directors [have been] grossly negligent in failing to inform themselves,
before acting," the decision is deemed to be informed).
88. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling off the Lynch Mob: The Cmporate Director's
Fiduciary Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REv. 1087, 1089-91 (1996); SEC CF Disclosure
Guidance, supra note 22.
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Directors' and officers' fiduciary duty to shareholders and the
corporation imposes a duty to disclose-sometimes referred to as a duty
of complete candor-that is well established in Delaware common law.'
Two decades ago, Professor Lawrence A. Hamermesh noted that
Delaware courts have recognized "that a fiduciary duty to disclose all
material information arises when directors approve any public
statement, such as a press release, regardless of whether any specific
stockholder action is sought."' Director negligence is irrelevant in
assessing the duty to disclose." The duty serves two purposes: (1) to
"afford stockholders a remedy," regardless of whether they relied
upon a misstatement or omission, and (2) "to afford a 'virtual per se
rule' of damages," awarding stockholders a monetary award "without
having to establish actual loss.""92
The Delaware Supreme Court later confirmed Professor
Hamermesh's interpretation. In Malone v. Brincat," the Delaware
Supreme Court clarified that directors and officers owe a duty of
honesty to shareholders in both communications seeking shareholder
action and "[w]henever directors communicate publicly or directly
with shareholders about the corporation's affairs, with or without a
request for shareholder action."" The court held that "directors who
knowingly disseminate false information that results in corporate
injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate their fiduciary
duty, and may be held accountable in a manner appropriate to the
circumstances."" In sum, the duty to disclose in Delaware requires
that directors provide shareholders with "all material information"
about the corporation whenever they communicate with the
shareholder or market, even if the shareholder did not request it.'
Additionally, the SEC's 2011 Guidance notes that "federal
securities laws, in part, are designed to elicit disclosure of timely,
comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that
a reasonable investor would consider important to an investment
decision." Although the Guidance acknowledges that "no existing
disclosure requirement explicitly refers to cybersecurity risks and
89. Hamermesh, supra note 88, at 1097 & nn.34-35.
90. Id. at 1091.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 9.
96. Shannon German, What They Don't Know Can Hurt Them: Corporate Officers'
Duty of Candor to Directors, 34 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 221, 233 (2009).
97. SEC CF Disclosure Guidance, supra note 22.
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cyber incidents," the SEC nonetheless required the disclosure of
"material information regarding cybersecurity risks and cyber
incidents" to prevent misleading the public."
The Guidance provides examples of situations in which disclosure
is mandatory-several of which are likely implicated here. First, the
Guidance provides that the SEC "expect[s] registrants to evaluate
their cybersecurity risks and take into account all available relevant
information, including prior cyber incidents and the severity and frequency
of those incidents."' Second, the Guidance advises that
[r]egistrants should address cybersecurity risks and cyber
incidents ... if the costs or other consequences associated with one
or more known incidents or the risk of potential incidents
represent a material event, trend, or uncertainty that is reasonably
likely to have a material effect on the registrant's results of
operations, liquidity, or financial condition.100
Consequently, some commentators-like Jacob Olcott, former
Senate Commerce Committee counsel-believe that the "Yahoo hack
could become a test case of the SEC's [2011] guidelines.. . . due to
the size of the breach, intense public scrutiny and uncertainty over
the timing of Yahoo's discovery."101
II. YAHOO
A. Background
Founded in 1994 as Jeny and Dave's Guide to the World Wide Web by
Stanford graduate students Jerry Yang and David Filo, Yahoo was
incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware in 1995.102
Headquartered in Sunnyvale, California, milestones in Yahoo's
corporate growth include completion of an initial public offering on
April 12, 1996, and subsequent listing under the ticker symbol "YHOO"
on the NASDAQ Global Market."0 ' Yahoo describes itself as "a guide to
digital information discovery, focused on informing, connecting, and
entertaining [its] users through [its] search, communications, and
98. Id.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id.
101. See Dustin Volz, Yahoo Hack May Become Test Case for SEC Data Breach Disclosure
Rules, REUTERs (Sept. 30, 2016, 5:24 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-
cyber-disclosure-idUSKCN1202MG.
102. SeeYahoo! Inc., Preliminary Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Sept. 9, 2016)
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digital content products. By creating highly personalized experiences,
[Yahoo] help [s] users discover the information that matters most to
them around the world---on mobile or desktop."o4
For the fiscal year that ended December 31, 2015, Yahoo's revenue
reached $4.96 billion, with search and display advertising accounting
for 84 percent.0 ' Accordingly, Yahoo articulates its value proposition
for advertisers as consisting of "a streamlined, simple advertising
technology stack that leverages Yahoo's data, content, and technology
to connect advertisers with their target audiences," where
"[a]dvertisers can build their businesses through advertisements
targeted to audiences on [Yahoo's] online properties and services ...
and a distribution network of third-party entities."'
Social media and electronic commerce websites face significant
competition and other risk factors.o' Yahoo's significant competition
includes that from "search engines, sites offering integrated internet
products and services, social media and networking sites, ecommerce
sites, companies providing analytics, monetization and marketing
tools for mobile and desktop developers, and digital, broadcast and
print media."' Yahoo also experiences substantial international
competition from local service providers in the Latin America,
Middle East, Asia, and European markets."o
Yahoo's approximate thirty-six percent ownership position in
Yahoo Japan resulted from a 1996 joint venture agreement with
SoftBank Group Corp. ("SoftBank"). io In addition, on October 23,
2005, Yahoo acquired an approximate forty percent equity position
(on a fully-diluted basis) in Alibaba, a Chinese e-commerce business,
common stock in exchange for Yahoo's China-based businesses-a
cash investment of $1 billion and $8 million in transaction costs."'
Alibaba's core commerce enterprise in the People's Republic of China
consists of two distinct marketplace operations: wholesale commerce
104. Yahoo! Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 4 (Feb. 29, 2016) [hereinafter
Yahoo 2015 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0001193125
16483790/dl2894d10k.htm.
105. Id. at 13, 37.
106. Id.at4.
107. See Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment System
Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAvIs Bus. L.J. 261, 264 (2016) (including as risk
factors "credit cards; U.S. state money transmission laws; online and mobile growth;
and reliance on internet access").
108. Yahoo 2015 10-K, supra note 104, at 12.
109. Id.
110. See Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 102, at 35.
111. Seeid.at36.
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and retail commerce.112  Alibaba's third area of core commerce
business consists of cross-border and international commerce.
Other significant Alibaba businesses include cloud computing,
entertainment, mobile media, and other innovation initiatives.'- A
series of Alibaba transactions have been significant to Yahoo's fortunes
during recent years: In 2012, Alibaba repurchased 523 million shares
from Yahoo in exchange for $7.1 billion.11 5 And in 2014, Yahoo sold
140 million shares during Alibaba's initial public offering for
approximately $9.4 billion." As of September 13, 2016, Yahoo retains
an approximate fifteen percent interest in Alibaba outstanding
ordinary shares,"7 valued at approximately $36.7 billion."
Third quarter 2016 results for Yahoo showed continued
deterioration in core advertising revenues, constituting the seventh
decline in this key business metric during the past eight quarters.19
Table 1 illustrates certain financial results for Yahoo during the fiscal
years that ended December 31 for the periods 2013 through 2015,
and it displays the following key financial metrics:
[R]evenue; revenue less traffic acquisition costs ("TAC"), or
revenue ex-TAC; income (loss) from operations; adjusted earnings
before interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization ("EBITDA");
net income (loss) attributable to Yahoo! Inc.; net cash provided by
(used in) operating activities; and free cash flow. Revenue ex-TAC,
adjusted EBITDA, and free cash flow are financial measures that
are not defined in accordance with U.S. generally accepted
accounting principles ("GAAP"). These non-GAAP financial
measures are helpful for internal managerial purposes and to
facilitate period-to-period comparisons.120






118. Jen Wieczner, Here's Why Alibaba Will Never Buy Back Yahoo Stake, FORTUNE
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/09/13/alibaba-yahoo-stock.
119. See Deepa Seetharaman, Yahoo Looks to Bright Side After Breach, WALL ST. J.
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Table 1: Yahoo Key Financial Metrics21
Amount (in thousands of dollars) for Years Ended
Financial Metric December 31
2013 2014 2015
Revenue 4,680,380 4,618,133 4,968,301
Revenue x-TAC 4,425,938 4,400,602 4,090,787
Income (os)from operan 589,926 142,942 (4,748,494)
A d E 1BITDA) . 1,564,245 1,361,548 951,740
N nm oss) 1,366,281 7,521,731 (4,359,082)
Nh ddY(ied n) 1,195,247 916,350 (2,383,422)
operatng anartwifs
ee fou . ~ 786,465 586,632 (3,010,172)
Stockasd tompaoswnexpense 278,220 420,174 457,153
Jirutubn cgh~ret>~. 3766 103,450 104,019
Asit zmpara htcha - - 44,381
ooin impamnent cwharge- 63,555 88,414 4,460,837
Intangales mp'azrment charge - - 15,423
Table 2 provides selected consolidated financial operations data
and the consolidated balance sheets data for 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014,
and 2015.
Table 2: Yahoo Selected Financial Datam
Amount (in thousands of dollars, except per share amount) for Years Ended
Item December 31
2011: 2012 201.3 2014 2015
Revenue 4,984,199 4,986,566 4,680,380 4,618,133 4,968,301
Total
Operazing 4,183,858 4,420,198 4,090,454 4,475,191 9,716,795
Expenses
121. Yahoo 2015 10-K, supra note 104, at 41, item 7.
122. "During the fiscal year that ended December 31, 2015, [Yahoo] satisfied the
$3.3 billion income tax liability related to the sale of Alibaba Group American
Depositary Shares (ADSs) in Alibaba Group's initial public offering ('Alibaba Group
IPO') in September 2014." Id.
123. Yahoo 2015 10-K, supra note 104, at 37, item 6. Footnotes 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7
have been omitted from this presentation but may be found on page 38 of Form 10-K
for the Period Ended Dec. 31, 2015.
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Income (Loss)




27,175 4,647,839 43,357 10,369,439 (75,782)
B / (241,767) (1,940,043) (153,392) (4,038,102) 89,598
Income 7 d
Earringi
-1ttaey 476,920 676,438 896,675 1,057,863 383,571
~Net.IneAhneA
A 1,048,827 3,945,479 1,366,281 7,521,731 (4,359,082)
iJnc.I
Attributable
0.82 3.31 1.30 7.61 (4.64)
Inc. (6 o2Mmon"?
Stockholders




Caidt 11274,240 1,192,775 1,052,705 987,819 939,141
n Per Share-"aI.U t[ 1,282,282 1,202,906 1,070,811 1,004,108 939,141
on 203,958 224,365 278,220 420,174 457,153
24,420 236,170 3766 103,450 104,019
ofilbaba - 4,603,322 -
ouShares ___ _ 10,319,437
Gaul cmi Sale
ofAhbaa,- - 10,319,437 -
Group ADSs ____ ____ ____ ____ ____
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As shown in Table 2, when Yahoo's sale of Alibaba stock for
$10.369 billion during 2014 is removed, ongoing operating results
appear even more severe. When highlighting Consolidated
Statements of Operations Data for just Net Income (loss) attributable
to Yahoo, note the substantial decline in income from operations
during the fiscal year that ended December 31, 2015. The downward
trend in results from operations during years 2013, 2014, and.2015
likely resulted in the Board's decision to offer the Company for sale.
With a goal of maximizing shareholder value, for many years the
Yahoo board of directors and management examined various
alternatives to optimizing the value of its equity positions in both
Alibaba and Yahoo Japan. Given the market value of Yahoo's
component parts-Yahoo and its net cash position, Alibaba, and
Yahoo Japan-the Yahoo board considered Yahoo's stock price to be
significantly undervalued and believed
at that time that separating Yahoo's equity stakes in Alibaba and
Yahoo Japan from its core operating business would create value
by, among other things: providing the investor community with
greater clarity and focus with respect to the value of Yahoo's
operating business; enabling the management of Yahoo to focus
exclusively on its operating business; enhancing Yahoo's ability to
attract, retain, and incentivize management and employees by
creating equity-based compensation that more accurately and
efficiently reflects the performance of Yahoo's operating business;
and enhancing Yahoo's ability to pursue strategic acquisitions by
creating a more efficient equity currency.124
This complex analysis explored both taxable and tax-efficient
scenarios for monetizing these equity interests and involved the
expertise of a number of internationally recognized investment
banks, accounting firms, and law firms.125
As Yahoo's board continued to explore how best to separate its
equity position in Alibaba from Yahoo's operating business, it
announced plans to spin-off the remaining holdings in Alibaba on
January 27, 2015.126 Approximately nine months later, the IRS
informed Yahoo's legal counsel, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom LLP ("Skadden Arps"), that a favorable tax ruling for the
124. See Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 102, at 36.
125. Id. at 35-36 (maintaining that these efforts were among the primary events
that led to "the execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement").
126. Id. at 36 (emphasizing that the transaction was at first contingent on a
favorable ruling by the IRS that would allow Yahoo's counsel to opine that the
transaction would receive "tax-free treatment").
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proposed spin-off would not be forthcoming.'7 As a result, the Yahoo
board announced on December 9, 2015, that work on the proposed
spin-off had been suspended.121 Subsequently, the Yahoo board
considered the feasibility, timing, and potential tax implications of
alternatives, including the sale of Yahoo's operating business."
Yahoo's telephonic board meeting on January 31, 2016, was
attended by representatives of investment banks Goldman Sachs and
J.P. Morgan, and counsel from law firms Skadden Arps and Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati ("Wilson Sonsini").1so At the meeting, the
Yahoo board authorized formation of a special committee of
independent directors to consider and evaluate possible strategic
transactions involving Yahoo's operating businesses.'3 1  This initial
Strategic Review Committee ("SRC") consisted of Maynard G. Webb,
serving as Chairman; H. Scott Lee, Jr.; and Thomas J. McInerney.3 2
Also at this time, the Yahoo board authorized the SRC to retain, at
Yahoo's expense, "such outside counsel, financial advisors, and other
outside advisors" as deemed necessary to carry out its prescribed
duties.13 1 Moreover, Yahoo's board determined that it would not
approve "any strategic transaction related to Yahoo's operating
business" unless the SRC recommended such a transaction.M
Along with its quarterly and year-end 2015 annual financial results
on February 2, 2016, Yahoo announced that its board would explore
"strategic alternatives for separating Yahoo's operating business from
its Alibaba shares," including a reverse spin-off transaction.'
Subsequently, the Company's financial advisors contacted fifty-one
parties to explore their potential interest in a viable transaction,
127. Id.
128. Id. at 37.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 38.
132. Id.
133. Id. For more information on special committees and independent counsel,
see generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Edward B. Rock, A New Player in the Boardroom:
The Emergence of the Independent Directors' Counsel, 59 Bus. Law. 1389 (2014) (providing
an overview on independent counsel and special committees of the board and
discussing, generally, how changes in stock exchange regulation has mandated their
implementation in many instances). See Audra L. Boone & J. Harold Mulherin, How
do Corporate Boards Balance Monitoring and Advising? The Situational Use of Special
Committees in Corporate Takeovers 40 (Dec. 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssm.com/abstract=1783064 (suggesting that of 845 sampled takeovers between
2003 and 2007, special committees were implemented 24% of the time).
134. Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 102, at 38.
135. Id.
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executing confidentiality agreements with thirty-two of these parties
between February 19 and April 6, 2016.1' Yahoo provided interested
parties access to a virtual data room along with management
presentations and three years of forecasted financial information
previously reviewed by Yahoo's board."' Over time, potential investors
continued analysis activities, and the Yahoo board and its SRC
continued to meet.3' However, the composition of the SRC changed,
with Mr. Scott resigning and Catherine J. Friedman and Eric K Brandt
being appointed as independent Yahoo directors "to fill vacancies."13 9
During the last two weeks of March 2016, Yahoo management
conducted half-day presentations to seven potentially interested
parties, including Verizon.o Also during this period, the Company
communicated proper guidelines for non-binding indications of interest
with a deadline of April 11, 2016."41 Fourteen parties indicated interest
on April 18, 2016, so the Company and its financial advisors reviewed
and compared these first-round proposals.142 On April 20 and 21, 2016,
the SRC held meetings to review first-round proposals and determine
which of these bidders it should encourage to participate in the next-
round."' Yahoo reported that, following these discussions, the SRC
concluded the board should pursue selling Yahoo's entire operating
business "through a competitive auction process," which could maximize
value for Yahoo's stockholders while also noting that alternative deal
structures could still be considered later on.1 "
At this point in the bid process, on April 26, 2016, Yahoo reached a
proxy fight settlement with activist investors Starboard Value LP and
some of their affiliates, which involved Yahoo's 2016 annual meeting
election of directors.'" In the settlement, Yahoo not only agreed to
name several new members to its Board and to the SRC but also "to
submit to a stockholder vote any decision recommended by the SRC
and approved by the board to sell Yahoo's operating business or any
similar transactions. "146
136. Id. at 39.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 40.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 41.
143. Id. at 42.
144. Id. at 42-43.
145. Id. at 43.
146. Id.
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Given what we now know about the massive 2014 data breach, May
12, 2016, may undertake particular significance depending on how much
the Yahoo Board and senior management knew about the breach.4 Via
the virtual data room, Yahoo disclosed to potential bidders initial drafts of
proposed purchase and reorganization agreements.1 4 s Given its potential
importance, Yahoo's disclosure states the following:
To minimize the liabilities that would be retained by Yahoo post-
closing, the initial draft purchase agreement was structured similar
to a typical purchase agreement in a public company acquisition,
with no post-closing indemnity by Yahoo and limited closing
conditions. In addition, the initial draft purchase agreement
provided, in the case of a strategic buyer, that Yahoo's unvested
employee equity awards would be assumed or substituted for
comparable buyer equity awards, and, in the case of a financial
sponsor buyer, that these awards would be accelerated at closing.
The draft purchase agreement also provided that Yahoo would be
required to pay the buyer a termination fee equal to 2.5 percent of
the base purchase price if, among other reasons, the purchase
agreement was terminated by the purchaser after the Board changed
its recommendation for the transaction or by Yahoo to accept a
superior proposal (the 'Yahoo termination fee"), and, in the case of
a financial sponsor buyer, that Yahoo would be entitled to a reverse
termination fee equal to 7.5 percent of the base purchase price if the
buyer did not consummate the transaction as a result of its debt
financing not being available (the "reverse termination fee"), and to
specific performance if the buyer's debt financing was available.'4 9
Given what we know now about the extent of knowledge within
Yahoo about the data breaches, this language appears to be a clear
attempt to shift the cost of cyber liability onto an acquiring entity. In
any event, Yahoo's attempts to minimize post-closing liabilities has
only partially worked as evidenced by Verizon's renegotiated
acquisition announcement that includes cyber liability cost sharing
between the two companies.
As of May 13, 2016, nine active bidders remained, and Yahoo
notified them about the guidelines and process for submitting their
interim non-binding proposals for acquisition of Yahoo's operating
business no later than June 6, 2016."50 It also instructed bidders to
147. See infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text (relating that some Yahoo
employees knew of the breach in real time and that Mayer knew no later than July 2016).
148. Id. at 44.
149. Id. at 44.
150. Id.
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submit a list of key issues in their transaction agreement drafts.151
The remaining bidders conducted considerable due diligence activity
during the end of May and the beginning of June, culminating in
Yahoo's receipt of six non-binding interim proposals on June 6,
2016.152 Numerous discussions between the six remaining bidders
and Yahoo's financial advisors continued thereafter in efforts to
clarify terms and understand any changes in valuations from initial
indications of interest.' For instance, between June 13 and 19,
Yahoo's outside consultants communicated with each of the
remaining bidders to respond to any issues the bidders raised in their
interim bids." At the same time, the SRC relayed to bidders
upcoming deadlines."155
At Yahoo's SRC meeting on June 16, 2016, the SRC "expressed a
desire for bidders to be guided to submit final mark-ups of the
transaction agreements that would enable Yahoo to be in a position to
enter into definitive transaction agreements with the winning bidder as
soon as possible after final bids were received."'" Between June 20 and
24, 2016, each of the remaining five bidders submitted proposals in the
form of initial markups of the transaction agreements.5' During the
days that followed, Yahoo's attorneys and financial advisors discussed
and clarified proposed transaction terms, resulting in five detailed
proposals (three with executed financing commitments) being
received by Yahoo and reported in detail within the Yahoo proxy
material.'8 Following multiple conference calls to discuss these
proposals with Yahoo's financial advisors, the SRC recommended that
Yahoo should "negotiate definitive transaction agreements with
Verizon on an expedited basis," based upon the following:
* Verizon's bid offered the highest base purchase price;
* Verizon had submitted the transaction agreement mark-
ups that were most responsive to the Strategic Review
Committee's concerns regarding value, certainty of
closing, and leaving the post-closing entity with limited
liabilities unrelated to the assets retained by Yahoo;
151. Id.
152. Id. at 45.
153. Id. at 46.




158. Id. at 47-50.
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* Verizon had sufficient funds to finance the transaction,
whereas the financing of the financial sponsor bidders was
less certain; and
* Verizon had substantially completed its due diligence
review, whereas the financial sponsors needed additional
time to complete their due diligence review.159
During the days immediately following, Yahoo's lawyers and
financial advisors continued to negotiate definitive transaction
agreements with Verizon on an expedited basis.'" Revised drafts of
the agreement were circulated.'61  On numerous occasions
throughout this process, Yahoo's lawyers reviewed with the SRC their
fiduciary duties and other relevant legal considerations.162 Then, at a
Yahoo board meeting held on the evening of July 22, 2016, the terms
and conditions of the Verizon offer were reviewed, following
discussion by attorneys of the Yahoo board's fiduciary duties, the
scope of authority delegated to the SRC by the Yahoo board, and
certain other matters, including the insufficiency of a proposal
received by Yahoo after the decision to move forward with the
Verizon offer.'6' Each of Yahoo's financial advisors (J.P. Morgan, PJT
Partners, and Goldman Sachs) rendered their fairness opinions,
stating that "the Cash Consideration to be paid in the Sale
Transaction . . . pursuant to the purchase agreement, was fair, from a
financial point of view.""
The July 22, 2016 Yahoo board meeting then recessed so that the
SRC could meet in an executive session, at which time the SRC
unanimously recommended to the full Yahoo board to approve the
purchase agreement and all other associated negotiated agreements
with Verizon." Following the SRC's recommendation, the Yahoo
board reconvened and, by unanimous vote of all directors present,
* determined that the Sale Transaction Agreements and the
Sale Transaction [were] expedient and for the best
interests of Yahoo and its stockholders,
* approved the Sale Transaction Agreements and the Sale
Transaction,
159. Id. at 50-51.
160. Id. at 51.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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* recommended, subject to the terms of the Stock Purchase
Agreement, that the Yahoo stockholders adopt a resolution
authorizing the Sale Transaction, and
* directed that the Sale Transaction be submitted for
consideration by the stockholders at the special meeting.166
With this unanimous vote, Yahoo's directors and officers sought
shareholder approval of the Verizon acquisition detailed below.
B. The Verizon Acquisition
On July 23, 2016, the parties entered into a Stock Purchase
Agreement, providing that Verizon purchase all of Yahoo's
outstanding shares of Yahoo Holdings for a cash purchase price of
$4,825,800,000, subject to certain adjustments as provided for within
the contract for sale.
As renegotiations stemming from the data breach disclosures
continued in early 2017, Yahoo announced on January 10, 2017, that
when the Company completes the Verizon deal, Yahoo will "whittle
down its board" by six members, with several longtime directors-
including CEO Marissa Mayer and co-founder David Filo-stepping
down from the board." Upon sale of its core internet business to
Verizon, the remaining entity will rename itself Altaba, Inc., and
Altaba's remaining assets will include Yahoo's stake in Alibaba Group
Holdings Ltd. and Yahoo Japan. 6 '
On February 15, 2017, news of a renegotiated deal between
Verizon and Yahoo leaked, and the leak asserted that the two
companies had agreed on a new price $250 million lower than their
initial agreement.170  But on February 21, 2017, when Verizon
disclosed the renegotiated deal to acquire Yahoo's core Internet
business, Verizon announced a $350 million discount.171  The
renegotiated price brings the original $4.8 billion price down to
166. Id.
167. Id. at 52-53.
168. Deepa Seetharaman & Maria Armental, Marissa Mayer to Leave Yahoo Board;




170. Scott Moritz, Alex Sherman & Brian Womack, Verizon Said to Near Yahoo Deal
at Lower Price After Hacks, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 15, 2017, 2:47 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-15/verizon-said-to-reach-
revised-price-for-yahoo-in-wake-of-hacks.
171. Seth Fiegerman, Verizon Cuts Yahoo Deal Price by $350 Million, CNN (Feb. 21, 2017,
9:12 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/02/21/technology/yahoo-verizon-deal.
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$4.48 billion. 172  Further, "Verizon and the entity that remains of
Yahoo after the deal, ... Altaba Inc., are expected to share any
ongoing legal responsibilities related to the breaches."17 ' The deal
closed onJune 8, 2017.174
Table 3 depicts selected financial data for Verizon for the periods
ending December 31, 2015, for the years indicated.
Table 3: Verizon Communications, Inc. Selected Financial Data175
Amount (in millions of dollars, except per share amount) for Years
Results of Ended December 31
Operations
20111ve 2012'" 7 2013 2014 2015
)~eratifRevenue$ 110,875 115,846 120,550 127,079 131,620
aperaing Incrmi 12,880 13,160 31,968 19,599 33,060
Net Incoiil
.Attributable to 2,404 875 11,497 9,625 17,879
onurn 0.850 0.310 4.010 2.420 4.380
0.850 0.310 4.000 2.420 4.370
I& D 'aerT~ 1.975 2.030 2.090 2.160 2.230
to 7,794 9,682 12,050 2,331 496I rozOfng
-Interests-'
Financial Position
TotalAxsts ~ 228,194 222,911 273,654 232,616 244,640
u 4,849 4,369 3,933 2,735 6,489
Withm Onui Year___________
LIn-Teri rebt 50,303 47,618 89,658 110,536 103,705
~mphaeBenefit 32,957 34,346 27,682 33,280 29,957
Norantrurntg ~ 49,938 52,376 56,580 1,378 1,414
Int eresls ___________________
172. Id.
173. Moritz, Sherman & Womack, supra note 170.
174. Deepa Seetharaman, Yahoo's Marissa Mayer to Make $186 Million from Verizon
Deal, Fox Bus. (Apr. 25, 2017), http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2017/04/25/
yahoos-marissa-mayer-to-make-186-million-from-verizon-deal.html.
175. VERIZON, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
176. "2011 data includes severance, pension and benefit charges and early debt
redemption costs." Id.
. 177. "2012 data includes severance, pension and benefit charges, early debt
redemption costs and litigation settlement charges." Id.
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Equity Artiatable to 35,970 33,157 38,836 12,298 16,428
VeaonIIII
C. The Breaches
On September 22, 2016, Yahoo announced (what was at that time)
"the largest data breach in history-affecting at least 500 million user
accounts.",78 Yahoo's statement on the breach disclosed that user
information-which included names, email addresses, telephone
numbers, birth dates, encrypted passwords and, in some cases,
security questions-was compromised in late 2014.17' Further,
Yahoo's statement alleged that an unnamed "state-sponsored actor"
was responsible for the breach.so In March 2017, the U.S.
Department of Justice indicted two Russian intelligence officers for
"directing a sweeping criminal conspiracy" to hack Yahoo in 2014 and
steal more than 500 million Yahoo users' personal information.
Then, on December 14, 2016, Yahoo disclosed an earlier and even
larger data breach than the 2014 breach disclosed in September
2016.182 This attack occurred in 2013 and exposed more than one
billion accounts, which "involved sensitive user information, including
names, telephone numbers, dates of birth, encrypted passwords and
unencrypted security questions that could be used to reset a
password."' It is, however, unclear how many of the same user
accounts were compromised in the 2013 and 2014 data breaches;
Yahoo has more than one billion active users, but there is lingering
uncertainty about the number of inactive accounts that were hacked.'14
Table 4 depicts the top ten breaches of all time and is helpful in
placing the Yahoo breaches-the two largest ever-into perspective
with other major data breaches.
178. Hayley Tsukayama, Craig Timberg & Brian Fung, Yahoo Data Breach Casts
"Cloud" over Verizon Deal, WASH. POST: THE SwrrcH (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2016/09/22/report-yahoo-
to-confirm-data-breach-affecting-hundreds-of-millions-of-accounts.
179. Yahoo Press Release, supra note 1.
180. Id.
181. Vindu Goel & Eric Lichtblau, Russian Agents Were Behind Yahoo Hack, US. Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/technology/
yahoo-hack-indictment.html.
182. Vindu Goel & Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says 1 Billion User Accounts Were Hacked,
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Table 4: Top 10 Data Breaches of All Time as of 2016"
Rank: Date Records Industry, Breach
Org Summary Eoe Name tor LocationReore Smm. Exposed Sco
Hack exposed
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6/23/2016 voter information. Million Reported States
185. DATA BREACH QUICKVIEW REPORT: 2016 DATA BREACH TRENDS-YEAR IN REVIEW
14 (2016), https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/hubfs/Reports/2016%2Year%20
End%20Data%20Breach%20QuickView%20Report.pdf (listing exposed hacks).
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Notwithstanding the magnitude of the security breaches,
considerable controversy surrounds the timing of when Yahoo
employees learned of the 2014 breach. Despite representing in a
September 9, 2016 SEC filing that Yahoo was not aware of any
security breaches"'-and a recent disclosure that at least some Yahoo
employees were aware of the breach in 20141 87-most current
accounts of internal knowledge of the breach maintain that CEO
Marissa Mayer was aware of it in late July 2 0 1 6 .1'
Because of the security breaches, many questions arise regarding
the corporate duties of Yahoo executives. The discussion below first
186. See Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 102, Exhibit A-18 ("To the
Knowledge of [Yahoo], there have not been any incidents of, or third party claims
alleging, (i) Security Breaches, unauthorized access or unauthorized use of any of
[Yahoo's]... information technology systems or (ii) loss, theft, unauthorized access
or acquisition, modification, disclosure, corruption, or other misuse of any Personal
Data in [Yahoo's] possession ... that could reasonably be expected to have a
Business Material Adverse Effect.").
187. See Yahool Inc., SEC Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 40 (Nov. 9, 2016),
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/4041065081x0xS1 193125-16-
764376/1011006/filing.pdf (disclosing that "[Yahoo] had identified that a state-
sponsored actor had access to the Company's network in late 2014"); see also Vindu
Goel, Yahoo Employees Knew in 2014 About State-Sponsored Hacker Attack, N.Y. TIMEs
(Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/10/technology/yahoo-employees
-knew-in-2014-about-hacker-attack.html.
188. See Madhumita Murgia, Tim Bradshaw & David J. Lynch, Marissa Mayer Knew
of Yahoo Breach Probe in July, FIN. TIMEs (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/d0d07444-81aa-1 1e6-bc52-Oc721 1ef3198.
2017] CORPORATE CYBERSECURTY STANDARD OF CARE
details facts relevant to whether Yahoo executives breached their duty
to provide security with a specific emphasis on Yahoo's cybersecurity
and data privacy practices before senior management definitively
learned of the breach in July 2016; second are facts relevant to
whether Yahoo executives breached their duty to monitor and be
informed; third and finally are facts relevant to whether Yahoo
executives breached their duty to disclose the existence of the breach
sooner than they did.
1. Facts relevant to Yahoo's duty to provide security
In 2010, Chinese military hackers breached several major Silicon
Valley technology corporations, including Google, Inc., and Yahoo.'"'
Google responded by designating cybersecurity "a top corporate
priority"1": the company hired hundreds of handsomely-compensated
cybersecurity engineers, invested hundreds of millions of dollars in
securing the fidelity of its data infrastructure, and "adopted a new
internal motto, 'Never again,' to signal that it would never again allow
anyone ... to hack into Google customers' accounts."'91 In contrast,
Yahoo's response was considerably slower and less robust, according to
at least six current and former Yahoo employees who were involved in
cybersecurity discussions and decision making and who related these
internal deliberations to the New York Times in the wake of Yahoo's
disclosure of the 2014 data breach."'
Although Yahoo's former CEO Marissa Mayer was recruited in
2012-from security-conscious Google-to stage a turnaround for the
flagging corporation, amid a slew of competing priorities, Ms. Mayer
reportedly did not emphasize cybersecurity. 's In fact, in stark
contrast to Google's "Never Again" motto, Yahoo's cybersecurity team
was internally dubbed the "Paranoids," and they often clashed with
other aspects of the Company-particularly over the cost of
enhancing Yahoo's IT security."' In addition to cost concerns, Yahoo
often impeded the cybersecurity team's ability to effectively carry out
its mission out of a pervasive fear that "the inconvenience of added
189. Nicole Perlroth & Vindu Goel, Defending Against Hackers Took a Back Seat at






194. Id. (explaining that Ms. Mayer denied Yahoo's security team support and
funds needed to take proactive security measures, like implementing intrusion-
detection mechanisms for the company's production systems).
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protection would make people stop using the company's products."95
These dual cost-related concerns-the direct, tangible dollar cost of
implementing more thorough cybersecurity practices and the
indirect (though potentially more severe) cost of losing customers-
help explain many shortcomings of Yahoo's cybersecurity practices.
Four specific examples of Yahoo's seemingly lax commitment to
corporate cybersecurity from the New York Times report illustrate the
shortcomings of Yahoo's security. First, Yahoo did not begin
compensating hackers for providing the Company with information
on digital vulnerabilities until 2013-three years after Google
adopted the same policy-and Yahoo adopted the policy only "after it
lost countless security engineers to competitors and experienced a
breach of more than 450,000 Yahoo accounts in 2012 and a series of
humiliating spam attacks in 2013."'"
Second, even after it took Yahoo a year to hire a new chief
information security officer ("CISO") following former U.S. National
Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden's disclosure of
damaging information-which revealed that Yahoo was a constant
target for nation-state spies-Yahoo failed to empower, and denied
requested resources to, its new CISO.19 7
Outsiders initially hailed the 2014 hiring of CISO Alex Stamos, who
left the Company in 2015, as potentially signaling a renewed corporate
commitment to cybersecurity."* But Mr. Stamos frequently clashed with
Mayer and Yahoo's senior vice president, Jeff Bonforte, who oversaw
Yahoo's email and messaging services.1" For example, Mr. Bonforte
revealed in a December 2015 interview that Mr. Stamos had quickly
pressed senior management to adopt end-to-end encryption for the
Company's entire digital infrastructure, which would prevent Yahoo
from being able to read the content of users' communications."0o Mr.
Bonforte resisted the recommendation because doing so would hinder
the Company's ability to index and search message data, precluding it







201. Id. Mr. Bonforte expressly confirmed his resistance to Mr. Stamos's end-to-
end encryption recommendation, stating, "I'm not particularly thrilled with building
an apartment building which has the biggest bars on every window." Id.
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Third, Ms. Mayer repeatedly refused to invest meaningful resources
to secure Yahoo's security infrastructure-to the chagrin of Mr.
Stamos and his team. According to the half-dozen insiders, Ms.
Mayer "denied Yahoo's security team financial resources and put off
proactive security defenses, including intrusion-detection
mechanisms for Yahoo's production systems."202 Some commentators
have deemed Ms. Mayer's refusal to invest in Mr. Stamos's team and
follow their recommendations a major contributor to a mass exodus
from the Company's cybersecurity team that Mr. Stamos assembled.20 s
According to the publication Recode, "[o]ne executive close to the
situation said that former Yahoo information security head Alex
Stamos had tried aggressively to get management o act more strongly
at the time, but he had not been successful," which ultimately led to
Mr. Stamos' resignation from Yahoo and move to Facebook as chief
security officer in mid-2015.0
Fourth and finally, Ms. Mayer rejected the suggested
implementation of one of the most basic security measures:
automatically resetting all users' passwords, "a step security experts
consider standard after a breach."2 05 Ms. Mayer's rationale for
rejecting such a fundamental staple of data breach response derived
from a "fear that even something as simple as a password change
would drive Yahoo's shrinking email users to other services." 2
Indeed, a Yahoo spokesperson confirmed this continues to be the
Company's policy: "Yahoo's policy is that if we believe a user's
password has been compromised, we lock the account until the user
resets the password."20
For its part, Yahoo has pushed back against the narrative that its
cybersecurity practices prior to discovery and disclosure of the 2014
data breach were inadequate. For instance, a Company spokesperson
told the New York Times that "the company spent $10 million on
encryption technology in early 2014, and that its investment in
security initiatives will have increased by 60 percent from 2015 to
202. Id.
203. Id. (stating that many Paranoids left Yahoo for competitors like Apple,
Facebook, and Google in recent years). I
204. Kara Swisher & Kurt Wagner, Yahoo Has Confirmed a Data Breach with 500
Million Accounts Stolen, as Questions About Disclosure to Verizon and Users Grow, RECODE
(Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.recode.net/2016/9/22/13021300/yahoo-hack-data-
breach-500-million-accounts-stolen.
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2016."2' Nonetheless, the recently disclosed 2013 breach, which
compromised more than one billion user accounts, further
undermines Yahoo's claim that its data security practices were
adequate." Jay Kaplan, the chief executive of the data security
company Synack, made a succinct case to the New York Times for how
these most recent disclosures support the narrative that Yahoo's data
security practices were grossly deficient over a period of years:
"What's most troubling is that this occurred so long ago, in August
2013, and no one saw any indication of a breach occurring until law
enforcement came forward."210
On March 1, 2017, Yahoo announced the results of an internal
investigation into the Company's handling of the data breaches.
Ronald Bell, Yahoo's General Counsel, resigned, and Mayer's pay would
be docked about $14 million dollars-the result of giving up a 2016 cash
bonus and foregoing a 2017 stock award.212 The blame lay with Bell
because, according to the Company, "the Committee found that the
relevant legal team had sufficient information to warrant substantial
further inquiry in 2014, and they did not sufficiently pursue it. "213
2. Facts relevant to Yahoo's duty to monitor
We now turn to address facts concerning the adequacy of Yahoo's
internal monitoring and reporting processes. The facts related in
this section are later implicated in our analysis of whether Yahoo's
monitoring and reporting procedures fell below the standard of care
necessitated by the duty to monitor.
Yahoo recently disclosed that at least some Yahoo employees knew
of the 2014 data breach in nearly real-time.1 This revelation raises
questions about the adequacy of Yahoo's internal monitoring and
reporting processes. In a September 30, 2016 filing with the SEC,




211. Kara Swisher, Yahoo's Head Lawyer Is Taking the Fall for Its Hacking, While CEO




213. Yahoo 2015 10-K, supra note 104, at 47.
214. Hannah Kuchler, Yahoo Admits Some Staff Knew of Hacking in 2014, FIN. TIMS
(Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/ce7a4784-a6ca-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1.
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Company's network in late 2014."12" The filing further disclosed that
an independent committee of Yahoo's board of directors had
launched an investigation into the "scope of the knowledge within
the Company in 2014.12"16 Additionally, the filing suggested,
troublingly, that a hacker may have created the means to forge Yahoo
Mail cookies to allow access without requiring a password.1 This
disclosure raises the specter that a hacker could continue to have
unfettered access to Yahoo Mail users' accounts even after users reset
their passwords.2 18  However, a person close to Yahoo's internal
investigation "said Yahoo did not believe it was currently possible for
attackers to forge the Yahoo Mail cookies."219
The recently disclosed 2013 breach that compromised more than
one billion user accounts contradicts Yahoo's claim that its
monitoring and reporting systems were adequate. In fact, Yahoo
itself did not even discover the 2013 data breach: according to media
reports, Yahoo "discovered the larger hacking after analyzing data
files, provided by law enforcement, that an unnamed third party had
claimed contained Yahoo information."2 o
On March 1, 2017, Yahoo filed its Annual Report with the SEC and
in it the Company made several new disclosures about the extent of
internal knowledge of the breaches and the failure of its reporting
and monitoring systems.221 According to Yahoo, the investigation
found that "the Company's information security team had
contemporaneous knowledge of the 2014 compromise of user
accounts, as well as incidents by the same attacker involving cookie
forging in 2015 and 2016," and that "[i]n late 2014, senior executives
and relevant legal staff were aware that a state-sponsored actor had
accessed certain user accounts by exploiting the Company's account
management tool."2 1
215. Yahool Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Nov. 9, 2016) [hereinafter
Yahoo Nov. 10-Q], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0001193125
16764376/d244526d10q.htm.
216. Id. Compare Swisher & Wagner, supra note 204 (reporting that Mayer knew
about the security breach in early August 2016), with Murgia, Bradshaw & Lynch, supra
note 186 (reporting that Mayer knew about the security breach in late July 2016).
217. Yahoo Nov. 10-Q, supra note 215.
218. Kuchler, supra note 214.
219. Id.
220. See Goel & Perlroth, supra note 182.
221. See Yahool Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 1, 2017) [hereinafter
Yahoo 2016 10-K], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/0001193125
17065791/d293630d10k.htm.
222. Id. at 47.
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The report details management's efforts to respond to these
threats but notes that "it appears certain senior executives did not
properly comprehend or investigate, and therefore failed to act
sufficiently upon, the full extent of knowledge known internally by
the Company's information security team. "2 Specifically, according
to Yahoo, "as of December 2014, the information security team
understood that the attacker had exfiltrated copies of user database
backup files containing the personal data of Yahoo users but it is
unclear whether and to what extent such evidence of exfiltration was
effectively communicated and understood outside the information
security team."2 2 ' This finding, put simply, means that Yahoo's
internal digital security team knew in December 2014 that a hacker
had successfully copied large portions of the Company's database-
which included the personal data of hundreds of millions of Yahoo
users-but it is "unclear whether and to what extent" that knowledge
was communicated to senior management.
Despite this explicit lack of clarity regarding "whether and to what
extent" senior management knew what the information security team
knew in December 2014, the report boldly claims that "the
Independent Committee did not conclude that there was an
intentional suppression of relevant information."2 And yet,
according to Yahoo, "the Committee found that the relevant legal
team had sufficient information to warrant substantial further inquiry
in 2014, and they did not sufficiently pursue it," and, as a result of
that failure, "the 2014 Security Incident was not properly investigated
and analyzed at the time, and the Company was not adequately
advised with respect to the legal and business risks associated with the
2014 Security Incident."2 2 6
The report concludes, "The Independent Committee found that
failures in communication, management, inquiry and internal reporting
contributed to the lack of proper comprehension and handling of
the 2014 Security Incident."2 7
3. Facts relevant to Yahoo's duty to disclose
Concern over the conduct of Yahoo's senior management is not
limited to what senior management did and did not do prior to





227. Id. (emphasis added).
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failure to notify its shareholders, its potential acquirers, and
regulators-appearing to have publicly misrepresented the very
existence of the 2014 breach-between July 2016 and public disclosure
of the breach on September 22, 2016, implicate the duty to disclose.
Although an internal Yahoo investigation found no evidence of a
breach, an infamous cybercriminal and hacker, known by the
moniker "Peace," revealed the breach on the "dark web" in July or
August 2016." The hacker alleged that more than 200 million
Yahoo user accounts had previously been compromised and were for
sale.' Concerns over this allegation, however, allegedly spurred the
Company to investigate the claim more deeply; this more
sophisticated probe revealed the 2014 breach that affected more than
half a billion users' accounts.3 o
Yahoo's senior management has allegedly been involved in
investigating the truth of Peace's claims from the beginning.
According to a person familiar with Yahoo deliberations on Peace's
claims and the 2014 hack,
Marissa [Mayer] was aware absolutely-she was aware and involved
when Peace surfaced this allegation in July ... [She] was part of the
investigation and conversation from the very beginning and along
with the team every step of the evidentiary gathering and analysis
process. In fact, the key executive team has been engaged from the
very beginning.2 3 1
Despite Ms. Mayer's involvement, internal Yahoo sources bluntly told
Recode that "the company had been subjected to a number of previous
incidents that were not managed swiftly by CEO Marissa Mayer."12
Even more, Yahoo failed to disclose the 2014 data breach to three
constituencies until approximately two months after senior
management learned of the breach. First, the company did not
publicly disclose-either to its users or to its shareholders-the breach
until September 22, 2016. Second, Yahoo did not disclose the
breach to potential acquirer Verizon until September 19, 2016-
despite Verizon's commitment to acquire Yahoo's core business for
$4.8 billion on July 25, 2 0 1 6 .2" Finally, Yahoo not only failed to
228. See Murgia, Bradshaw & Lynch, supra note 186; Swisher & Wagner, supra note 204.
229. Swisher & Wagner, supra note 204.
230. Murgia, Bradshaw & Lynch, supra note 186.
231. Id.
232. Swisher & Wagner, supra note 204.
233. Id.
234. Murgia, Bradshaw & Lynch, supra note 186; see also Paul Szoldra, In September,
Yahoo Told Verizon It Hadn't Been Hacked-But Executives May Have Known for Months,
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disclose the breach to regulators, but it also represented that it was
unaware that any breach had occurred. Yahoo filed a document with
the SEC on September 9, 2016, with the following representation:
To the Knowledge of Seller, there have not been any incidents of or
third party claims alleging, (i) Security Breaches, unauthorized access or
unauthorized use of any of Seller's or the Business Subsidiaries'
information technology systems or (ii) 'loss, theft, unauthorized access
or acquisition, modification, disclosure, corruption, or other misuse of any
Personal Data in Seller's or the Business Subsidiaries' possession, or other
confidential data owned by Seller or the Business Subsidiaries (or
provided to Seller or the Business Subsidiaries by their customers)
in Seller's or the Business Subsidiaries' possession, in each case (i)
and (ii) that could reasonably be expected to have a Business
Material Adverse Effect.2 35
Both Ms. Mayer and Ronald Bell, Yahoo's General Counsel, signed
the September 9 SEC filing.236
On January 22, 2017, the Wall Street Journal, among other sources,
announced that the SEC opened an investigation into the timing of
Yahoo's disclosure of the breach. Specifically, the SEC sought to
uncover whether Yahoo's "two massive data breaches should have
been reported sooner to investors."23 7 Further, "[I]egal experts say
the SEC has been looking for a case to clarify what type of conduct
would run afoul of guidance the agency issued in 2011."121 Unlike
previous cases, including the Target Corp. breach in 2013 that
compromised as many as 70 million credit cards, the SEC seems to be
more confident about bringing its first-breach disclosure
enforcement action.3
The findings of Yahoo's 2016 Annual Report largely exculpate
senior management for its failure to disclose the existence of the
breaches much earlier.240  The report found that "[in late 2014,
senior executives and relevant legal staff were aware that a state-
sponsored actor had accessed certain user accounts by exploiting the
Bus. INSIDER (Sept. 23, 2016, 7 :06 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/yahoo-
deny-security-breaches-2016-9.
235. See Preliminary Proxy Statement, supra note 102, Exhibit A-18 (emphasis added).
236. Id. Exhibits A-73, B-28.
237. Aruna Viswanatha & Robert McMillan, Yahoo Faces SEC Probe over Data
Breaches, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2017, 9:56 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoo-
faces-sec-probe-over-data-breaches-1485133124.
238. Id.; see supra Section I.C.
239. See Viswanatha & McMillan, supra note 237 (quoting former SEC lawyers that
the Yahoo breach disclosure case "appears to provide a clearer set of circumstances"
than previous large breaches).
240. SeeYahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 221, at 47.
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Company's account management tool," but that "certain senior
executives did not properly comprehend or investigate, and therefore
failed to act sufficiently upon, the full extent of knowledge known
internally by the Company's information security team."a2 1  This
failure to properly comprehend and investigate the Company's
security issues in December 2014 is presumably senior management's
rationale for its failure to disclose.
The report does not, however, explain why Mayer and Bell made
the September 9 misrepresentation to the SEC. But as noted above,
Bell has resigned from the Company.
D. Compensation, Code ofEthics, and the Duty to Disclose Material Events
In addition to corporate officers' fiduciary duties, companies also
protect their shareholders by generating and relying upon internal
mechanisms. Such mechanisms function to deter and remediate
issues as they arise. Among the key internal controls, companies rely
on (1) executive compensation packages, (2) provisions for
"clawbacks" of compensation, (3) severance and change in control
provisions, (4) internal ethics policies, and (5) published core values.
Executive compensation has the power to influence corporate
decision making, especially amidst a material corporate event. The
following table presents compensation information for Yahoo's
Named Executive Officers for the years 2013, 2014, and 2015.
241. Id.
242. See id. ("In response to the Independent Committee's findings related to the
2014 Security Incident,. . . Ronald S. Bell resigned as the Company's General
Counsel and Secretary and from all other positions with the Company.").
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Table 5: Yahoo Summary Compensation Table..
Amount (in dollars)
2015 lM 1.1k 14.5M 19.9M - 550k 36M
Marissa A. 2014 1M - 11.7M 28.2M 1.1M 28k 42M
Mayer, CEO
2013 IM 2.2k 8.3M 13.8M 1.7M 73.8k 25M
2015 600k - 3.3M 11M - 4.6k 15M
Ken Goldman, 2014 600k - 2.8M 9.3M 300k 4.5k 13M
CFO
2013 600k - 2.6M 2.3M 500k 4.6k 6M
2015 1 1
David Filo, Co-
Founder & 2014 1 - - - - - 1
Chief Yahoo
2013 1 --- -- 1
idsa
Utzschneider, 2015 600k IM 8.4M - - 4.6k 10M
CRO
2015 600k - 3.9M - - 4.6k 4.5M
RoadG.Bel 2014 600k - 3.3M - 300k 4.5k 4.M
2013 600k - 3.9M -. 450k 4.6k 4.9M
As shareholder approval of the Verizon acquisition neared, Yahoo
made additional disclosures about the extent of executive
compensation. For example, the New York Times reported on April 24,
2017, that-based on Yahoo's then-current share price of $48.15,
which has since risen-Mayer's payout for the Verizon deal would be
more than $186 million." This $186 million is in addition to Mayer's
compensation (salary, bonus, and benefits) over the past five years,
243. SeYahool Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K/A), Amendment No. 1, 42 (Apr. 29,
2016) [hereinafter Yahoo 2015 10-K/A], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/1011006/000119312516569864/d77362d0kahtm. Due to space limitations,
footnotes appearing in the original document have been either truncated or omitted.
244. Vindu Goel, Marissa Mayer Will Make $186 Million on Yahoo's Sale to Verizon,
N.Y. TMES (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/technology/
marissa-mayer-will-make-1 86-million-on-yahoos-sale-to-verizon.html.
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which is reportedly in excess of $200 million." As Yahoo's share price
has continued to rise, Mayer's all-in compensation for her largely failed
tenure leading Yahoo will be approximately $400 million.
In addition to compensation, provisions for "clawbacks" of
compensation and severance packages also serve as an internal check
that may potentially influence corporate decision making. Yahoo
disclosed the following policy regarding its compensation clawback
applicable under certain circumstances:
We maintain a recoupment ("clawback") policy for incentive
awards paid to executive officers (including all of the Named
Executive Officers). In the event of a restatement of incorrect
Yahoo financial results, this policy permits the Board, if it
determines appropriate in the circumstances and subject to
applicable laws, to seek recovery of the incremental portion of the
incentive awards paid or awarded, whether in cash or equity, to our
executive officers in excess of the awards that would have been paid
or awarded based on the restated financial results.2m
While Yahoo has entered into change-in-control severance plans
with all eligible full-time employees, these arrangements contemplate
potential payments in the event that Yahoo terminates certain key
employees or in the event that management changes, such as in the case
of acquisition by Verizon."4 While more complex and detailed than
depicted here, the following list highlights some of the severance
benefits for Ms. Mayer, Mr. Goldman, Ms. Utzschneider, and Mr. Bell:
* one year of base salary;
* one year's target annual bonus;
* if the termination occurs after the end of a fiscal year and
before the Company's bonus payments for that fiscal year,
the executive's bonus for the completed fiscal year; and
* payments equal to the premiums required to continue
medical benefits under COBRA for up to twelve months
after termination.
245. Id.; see also Michael Nunez, Marissa Mayer Set to Receive $186 Million for Failing
Because This Is How Corporate America Works, GIZMoDo (Apr. 25, 2017, 11:16 AM),
http://gizmodo.com/marissa-mayer-set-to-receive-186-million-for-failing-b-1794625573
("The [$186 million] sum does not include Mayer's salary or bonuses over the past
five years, which reportedly add up to more than $200 million alone.").
246. See Yahoo! Inc., Report Filed on Form 10-K/A for the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2015, Amendment No. 1, 42 (Apr. 29, 2016) [hereinafter Yahoo 2015
10-K/A], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1011006/000119312516569864
/d177362d10ka.htm.
247. See id. at 38.
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* The executive will also have six months to exercise any
vested Company stock options.248
Table 6 presents Yahoo's estimated severance benefits to which
each of the following named executive officers would have been
entitled as of December 31, 2015, if Yahoo had terminated their
employment without cause.
Table 6: Hypothetical Change-in-Control Severance Benefit249
Amount (in dollars)
Marissa A. 3.OM 26.3k 15k 29.9M 21.9M 54.9M
Mayer
Ken Goldman 1.2M 54.2k 15k 8.8M 6.OM 16.1M
David Filo 2 54.2k 15k - - 69.0k
Lisa . 1.2M 54.2k 15k 18.6M 19.9M
Utzschneider
Ronald S. Bell 1.2M 54.2k 15k 7.8M - 9.0M
Lastly, a company's internal code of ethics and published core
values steer decision making in order to comply with such internal
controls. The key policies, fundamental principles, and procedures
governing Yahoo's business conduct is set forth in the Company's
code of ethics. The Company's contractors, as well as all of its
employees and directors, are subject to the code.25 o Within the forty-
eight page code of ethics document, "A Message from Yahoo's Board
of Directors" strongly emphasizes Yahoo's legacy of integrity and
commitment to continue upholding the highest ethical standards.
When discussing the core value of excellence, Yahoo declares "[it is]
committed to winning with integrity ... [and] [it] aspires to flawless
execution and [without] takling] shortcuts on quality."2 12 Under the
category of customer fixation, Yahoo states the following: " [w] e respect
248. Id. at 56.
249. Id. at 60.
250. Id. at 9.
251. See YAHOO!, INC., YAHOO's CODE OF ETHics: WINNING wITH INTEGRYIY 48
(2011), http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/YHOO/660619262x0x239565/
4f32dddO-82e5-47c2-ac7l-75403ebbb404/YahooCodeOfEthicsExt_1008.pdf.
252. Id. at 4.
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our customers above all else and never forget that they come to us by
choice" and "[w]e share a personal responsibility to maintain our
customers' loyalty and trust."53  Lastly, with respect to community,
Yahoo "share [s] an infectious sense of mission to make an impact on
society and empower consumers in ways never before possible."5
Yahoo appears to have all the appropriate boilerplate when it
comes to Code of Ethics discussion regarding "[a]ccurate
[b]usiness [c]ommunication, [r]ecords, and [c]ontracts."2
Accordingly, Yahoo states,
Accurate and reliable business records are critical to meeting our
financial, legal, and business obligations. If you are responsible for
creating and maintaining Yahoo's financial records, you must do so
in accordance with applicable legal requirements and generally
accepted accounting practices. Disclosures in reports and
documents filed with or submitted to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission and other public communications made by
Yahoo must be full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable.2 5 6
Yahoo's Code of Ethics requires the Company to disclose "clear,
truthful, and accurate" information about itself.2 5 7 Furthermore, the
Code encourages the public to contact the ECO or Legal Department
if one discovers "any omission, inaccuracy, or falsification in Yahoo's
business records (or its supporting information)."8
Of particular relevance to the 2014 data breach and subsequent
disclosure, Yahoo states that, "[c] onflicts of interest can arise in many
ways, including ... [u] sing your position or assignment at Yahoo for
personal gain ... And remember, you may not use other people to
do indirectly what you are prohibited from doing yourself."2 5 1
Regarding data security, Yahoo's Code of Ethics states,
By protecting our knowledge base and our information systems, we
protect our competitive advantage. If you are employed by Yahoo
or providing services to Yahoo, you may have access to confidential
and/or proprietary information regarding our business, users,
advertisers, content providers, vendors, partners, candidates for
employment .... Protecting this information is vital to our
253. Id.
254. Id.
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success. We are also committed to respecting the intellectual
property and protected information of others.m
While these declarations are typical and arguably boilerplate, the
debacle at Yahoo starkly demonstrates just how hollow corporate
commitments can be. Accordingly, the undeniable tension between
Yahoo's conduct and its commitments gives rise to the question: Is
there a substantial difference between what Yahoo says and what
Yahoo does?
E. Timeline ofEvents
The following Table provides a brief summary of events in
chronological order.
Table 7: Timeline Summary of Relevant Events
Year Date Event
2012 July Manssa Mayer is named CEO of Yahoo.
Yahoo suffers a breach that compromises over 1 billion
Sometime in 2013 user accounts, including names, telephone numbers,
2013 birthdates, passwords, and security questions.
Snowden disclosures begin. Yahoo is revealed to be a
June constant target for state-sponsored cyberattacks.
March Alex Stamos named Chief Information Security Officer.
A second Yahoo data breach occurs, which compromises
2014 Sometime in late 2014 at least 500 million user accounts' sensitive information.
At least some Yahoo employees are aware of it.
November Sony hack occurs.
2015 June Alex Stamos leaves Yahoo.
February Yahoo announces the sale of its core business.
Sometime in late July Senior management, including Marissa Mayer,
definitively learns of the 2014 data breach.
July 25 Verizon announces $4.8 billion deal to acquire Yahoo'sinternet operations.
2016 September 9 Yahoo represents in a filing 
with the SEC that it knows of
no cybersecurity vulnerabilities.
September 19 Yahoo informs Verizon of 2014 data breach affecting 
500
million user accounts.
September 22 Yahoo publicly discloses the existence of the 2014 
data
breach.
December 14 Yahoo publicly discloses the existence of the 2013 data
breach.
260. Id. at 15.
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Yahoo announces that multiple members of the Board,
January 10 including Marissa Mayer, will leave the company after the
Verizon acquisition closes (assuming it does).
The media reports that Yahoo is currently the subject of
January 22 an ongoing SEC investigation regarding the timing of its
breach disclosures.
Verizon announces a renegotiated deal for Yahoo's core
Internet business for $4.48 billion ($350 million less than
February 21 the original price) and with an agreement he two
companies.will share the future cost of liability stemming
from the breaches.
Yahoo's 2016 Annual Report details the results of an
internal investigation into the 2014 breach. Ronald Bell,
March 1 the Company's general counsel, resigns, and CEO
Marissa Mayer returns and forgoes compensation totaling
$14 million.
Yahoo shareholders vote to approve the sale of the
June 8 company's Internet businesses to Verizon.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Yahoo Breached the Duty to Provide Security, the Duty to Monitor, and
the Duty to Disclose
Before analyzing whether Yahoo's conduct between the 2014 data
breach and its disclosure in September 2016 breached a corporate
duty, we briefly address the overarching issue of the variety of
complainants who are already asserting these claims and are likely to
assert them in the future. The constituencies who have potential
claims against Yahoo for conduct connected to the breach and the
handling thereof is both wide and deep.
The FTC is likely to have a strong case against Yahoo for its
deficient cybersecurity practices, potentially breaching its duty to
provide data security.2 61 We refer to any potential liability resulting
from a settlement with the FTC or an adjudication in the FTC's favor
as "primary liability." Primary liability stands in contrast to the
possibility that a judgment in the FTC's favor may be later used by
Yahoo shareholders in a derivative action against the Company's
261. See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text (highlighting specific examples
ofYahoo's apparent failure to enact adequate corporate cyber-security practices).
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directors and officers; we refer to any potential liability stemming
from a settlement or an adverse judgment against Yahoo's directors
and/or officers in a derivative suit as "secondary liability."
Conversely, the duty to monitor is explicitly a duty that officers and
directors owe to the corporate form and its shareholders,2 meaning that
liability stemning from a derivative action is the primary and only liability.
Finally, a breach of the duty to disclose will likely result in primary
liability flowing from both enforcement action by the SEC and potential
losses that Yahoo shareholders will suffer from the Verizon acquisition.
Similar to the duty to provide security, Yahoo shareholders may be able
to cite primary liability to the SEC and loss of Verizon value as a basis for
secondary liability through a derivative action.
1. Duty to provide data security
In light of the facts related to the breach of Yahoo's security
apparatus, it is exceptionally likely that the FTC will bring an
enforcement action against Yahoo, contending that Yahoo's lax
commitment to cybersecurity constituted an unfair trade practice.
Because the FTC's unfair trade practice liability theory considers a
robust WISP, the gold standard for exceeding the standard needed for
the duty to provide data security, this section analyzes Yahoo's
cybersecurity practices against the six relevant components of WISP."*
Assign Responsibility. Particularly with the 2014 hiring of Alex
Stamos to be Yahoo's CISO, Yahoo has appeared at times to be taking
data security more seriously." While hiring Mr. Stamos and
empowering him to build a team committed to securing the
Company's data was a step in the right direction, his departure after
only sixteen months-paired with news reports regarding frequent
clashes with more senior executives-suggests Yahoo's actions were
skewed towards changing appearances but not the underlying
262. See Gould v. Am. Hawaiian S.S. Co., 331 F. Supp. 981, 999 (D. Del. 1971)
(holding that directors owed a fiduciary duty to shareholders).
263. See supra Part 11 (discussing the Yahoo breach, including the facts giving rise to
Yahoo's breach of its fiduciary duties to provide data security, monitor, and disclose).
264. See supra note 52. We do not address the seventh and final element of WISP,
which addresses third party issues, because a technology company such as Yahoo has
significantly fewer third party issues than, for example, a retail business utilizing a
third-party vendor for online sales or a business in the service industry that relies on
a third-party cloud computing service. In short, technology companies like Yahoo
are prone to keep the overwhelming majority of their data and information in house.
265. See Perlroth & Goel, supra note 189 (examining Yahoo's response to its
compromised cybersecurity following a series of data breaches between 2010 and 2014).
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problems.2' This example provides an instructive lesson for other
companies: while hiring a seasoned and respected expert may be the
right first step, proper execution of this first WISP criterion requires
the company to actually empower the person assigned data security
responsibilities to be able to put a plan in place and execute that
plan. Mr. Stamos's brief tenure at Yahoo is illuminating because it
suggests a corporate commitment to the appearance of assigning
.responsibility, but the Company's actual practices fell short of the
necessary substantive changes to its data security policy. 7
Identify Information Assets; Conduct Risk Assessment. It seems likely that
Mr. Stamos and his team performed a process analogous to the second
and third WISP steps to identify Yahoo's information assets and to assess
its greatest risks. The insider account related by the New York Times,
however, suggests that much of the due diligence Mr. Stamos oversaw
was not prioritized or acted upon by the other members of Yahoo's
senior management.2' These WISP factors highlight the importance of
doing more than simply running through the motions: not taking the
security process seriously is potentially just as damaging as failing to
initiate a process altogether.69
Select and Implement Responsive Security Controls; Monitor Effectiveness;
Regularly Review the Security Program. Here, at the heart of WISP,
Yahoo's senior management's failures become most obvious. The
insider account of Yahoo's internal security process makes it plain
that CEO Marissa Mayer (likely at the behest of other senior officers)
was not simply oblivious to data security risks and the stakes of the
Company's deficiencies, but she was actively resistant to assigning the
necessary gravity to defraying the severity of these risks.2 70 This aspect
may unsurprisingly play an outsized role in the likely future FTC
enforcement action against Yahoo-many companies have settled
with the agency under far less damaging facts.2" Taken together, the
266. See id.
267. See, e.g., id. (comparing Google's comprehensive "Never Again" cybersecurity
overhaul with Yahoo's superficial cyber-security changes following the cyberattack by
Chinese military hackers in 2010, which compromised both Google and Yahoo).
268. See id.
269. Smedinghoff, supra note 10, at 9-10. Rather than requiring the
implementation of specific cybersecurity measures, WISP calls for a case-by-case
analysis to determine whether companies are recursively assessing security risks and
effectively enacting responsive and appropriate security measures.
270. SeePerlroth & Goel, supra note 189.
271. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2015).
The FTC filed a suit against Wyndham Worldwide Corporation for unfair trade
practices after hackers breached Wyndham's customer information database, stealing
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frequent clashes between Mr. Stamos and other senior executives
illustrate a company unable to execute the core elements of the
comprehensive written information security process.7
While the FTC appears to have a strong case that Yahoo's
cybersecurity practices constituted an unfair trade practice, the
question of potential secondary liability to shareholders in a
derivative action is far murkier.2 " Shareholders' potential derivative
claims that Yahoo's management breached its duty to provide security
are likely to face significant headwinds due to the business judgment
rule. Specifically, Yahoo may convincingly argue that the corporate
turnaround it was attempting to stage in the midst of the breach was
inherently a risky proposition.7 While business judgment plays no
role in a determination of liability for unfair trade practices, Yahoo's
management benefits from the level of deference afforded to
management decisions concerning the level of security to implement
and the amount of resources to invest in data security.2 7 5
The Company's announcement of its general counsel's resignation
and its CEO's nominal compensation forfeiture strikes many
observers as hollow and insufficient.2 7 ' There can be little doubt
much of the fault for the Company's failures rests at the highest
echelons of management, and we believe the Company is likely to be
forced to aggressively pursue settlements.
hundreds of thousands of customers' personal information. See id. In comparison,
Yahoo's 2014 security breach compromised at least 500 million user accounts.
272. See Perlroth & Goel, supm note 189 (recounting Ms. Mayer's frequent disputes
with Mr. Stamos over Ms. Mayer's lack of support for increased cybersecurity defenses).
273. We discuss the relationship between security and usability/profitability in
significantly more detail in the conclusion, but this relationship has tangential
relevance here as well.
274. See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. When Mr. Stamos began
working for Yahoo in 2014, he attempted to overhaul the cybersecurity system:
Stamos proposed an end-to-end encryption system that would have prevented Yahoo
from accessing user message data, thus restricting Yahoo's ability to tailoring user
services, and he also proposed user password reset measures that Yahoo directors
feared would drive users to abandon Yahoo services.
275. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003).
The business judgment rule is highly deferential and presumes that, "in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the
company." Id.
276. See Swisher, supra note 211 ("The blame for the massive breach falls on Ron
Bell and not where it belongs-at he top.").
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2. Duty to monitor
We are still early in the process of revelations concerning the
internal knowledge of the breach at Yahoo. More facts will
undoubtedly be made public in the coming months, and these
subsequent developments are almost certain to impact the analysis of
whether Yahoo's directors and/or officers are likely to face liability in
a shareholder derivative action that argues the Company's senior
executives breached their duty to monitor. The corporate law duty of
care centers on whether the corporate directors and officers
employed a "good faith effort" to remain reasonably informed
sufficient to "exercise good judgment."
But Yahoo admitted that at least some of its employees were aware
of the breach in 2014, which is likely to prove extremely damaging.7
Even if Yahoo did not ascertain the magnitude and size of the breach
until much closer to the date that it finally disclosed the breach, few
facts could mitigate the severity of deficiencies with Yahoo's internal
data security monitoring and reporting systems. Particularly because
Yahoo is a technology company-a business model that derives the vast
majority of its revenues directly or indirectly from its user base-the
fact that approximately two full years transpired between when some
employees knew and when senior management remediated and
disclosed strains credulity.278 At the very least-and taking Yahoo at
its word that senior management was in the dark about the breach
until late July 201627 9-two years of compartmentalized knowledge
within the Company suggests that even if Yahoo's monitoring and
reporting processes are not deficient in the abstract, they almost
certainly were in practice. Put differently, it is possible at least some
of Yahoo's mid-level employees believed that senior management did
not want to know about the Company's data security deficiencies. A
less charitable interpretation of the facts currently known is that
senior management actively discouraged robust monitoring and
reporting processes.2 o
277.. See Goel, supra note 187 (reporting that Yahoo employees' prior knowledge
of the cybersecurity breach, coupled with Yahoo's initial failure to disclose the
breach, may diminish the value of Yahoo in its negotiations with Verizon).
278. See id.
279. See Murgia, Bradshaw & Lynch, supra note 186 (relaying that, according to internal
sources at Yahoo, Ms. Mayer was not aware of the security breaches until lateJuly 2016).
280 See generally Marianne Jennings & Lawrence J. Trautman, Ethical Culture and
Legal Liability: The GM Switch Crisis and Lessons in Governance, 22 B.U.J. Sc. & TECH.
L. 187 (2016) (depicting an example of the failure of critical information regarding
a lethal ignition switch to gain timely disclosure and necessary corporate action).
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The Company's disclosures regarding its internal investigation into
the 2014 breach raise ever more questions. In its 2016 Annual
Report, the Company disclosed that in "December 2014, the
information security team understood that the attacker had
exfiltrated copies of user database backup files containing the
personal data of Yahoo users but it is unclear whether and to what
extent such evidence of exfiltration was effectively communicated
and understood outside the information security team."28' The
Company further argued, "there was [no] intentional suppression of
relevant information. The tension between these disclosures-
which, in the Annual Report, are immediately adjacent to one
another-is palpable and border on disingenuous. It is difficult to
ascertain how it may be, on the one hand, "unclear whether and to
what extent such evidence of exfiltration was effectively
communicated and understood outside the information security
team," but on the other hand, perfectly clear that "there was [no]
intentional suppression of relevant information."
In either event, it seems more likely than not that Yahoo's directors
and/or officers either knew or should have known about the breach
far sooner than they have currently admitted, likely opening them up
to potential liability under their corporate duty to monitor. The
remedial steps Yahoo has taken to date are thus unlikely to placate or
satisfy the Company's many potential plaintiffs.
3. Duty to disclose
Finally, Yahoo is quite likely to face primary liability for a breach of
the duty to disclose from one or more claimants. Directors owe a
"fiduciary duty to disclose all material information" to shareholders
whenever the Company voluntarily releases public information. 8
Because Yahoo did not disclose its security breaches with neither speed
nor efficiency, investors may have a claim under the securities laws.
First, the SEC appears to have an exceedingly strong case in a
future enforcement action against Yahoo. Even under the
interpretation most favorable to Yahoo's management-that hey
were unaware of the 2014 breach until late July or early August
2016211-it is difficult to explain why the Company's CEO and
281. Yahoo 2016 10-K, supra note 221, at 47.
282. Id.
283. See Hamermesh, supra note 88, at 1091 (noting that this duty to disclose is
triggered by the public release of information, regardless of whether stockholders
seek action against the company).
284. See Murgia, Bradshaw & Lynch, supra note 186.
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General Counsel signed an SEC filing in September 2016 that
represented the Company was unaware of any exploitation of
cybersecurity vulnerabilities.2 15 There is very little, if any, language in
the SEC's 2011 Guidance that could excuse what currently appears to
be a grave misrepresentation to financial markets, Yahoo's own
investors, and the SEC.86
With regard to secondary liability in a derivative action for penalties
incurred to the SEC, shareholders have a significantly stronger claim
here than they do under the Company's duty to provide security.
While decisions concerning the level of security measures and the
amount of resources to invest in security are likely protected by the
business judgment rule,2" a decision to convey a misrepresentation to
the SEC and the public concerning the existence of a breach is
difficult to justify even under a formulation of the business judgment
rule so deferential as to be rendered nonexistent.
Second, Yahoo faces the loss of $350 million from the proposed
renegotiated Verizon acquisition. Under the renegotiated deal,
Yahoo shareholders stand to lose hundreds of millions of dollars of
value due to management's cybersecurity failures, which may become
the source of a shareholder derivative cause of action. But Yahoo
management potentially has a strong rejoinder: in exchange for
$350 million less, the Company has secured Verizon's agreement o
share the cost of liabilities stemming from Yahoo's handling of the
data breaches. What remains unclear at this time is whether $350
million is a bargain for Verizon's promise to share liability costs.
At present, it is difficult to speculate on shareholders' prospects for
secondary liability for directors' and officers' conduct stemming from
the potential loss in value of the Verizon acquisition. There are
significant lingering questions about whether the $350 million
discount will ultimately be offset by the liability sharing agreement.
These issues should be resolved in the next few months.
That said, there are a few issues we feel comfortable opining on
currently. Whether a court applies the business judgment rule to
Yahoo management's decision about when to disclose the breach is
likely to prove dispositive to this particular claim. On the one hand, it is
conceivable a court, in a derivative action, will agree with Yahoo
management that they declined to disclose the breach during
285. See id.
286. See SEC CFDisclosure Guidance, supra note 22.
287. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 927 (Del. 2003)
(suggesting that, as a highly deferential standard ofjudicial review, the business judgment
rule presumes that directors' decisions are in the best interest of the corporation).
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negotiations with Verizon out of a fear that disclosure would increase
the chances that it would drive perhaps its only suitor away from the
bargaining table altogether. If a court were to accept this argument and
apply the business judgment rule to the disclosure decision, secondary
liability to shareholders is unlikely. On the other hand, if a court
accepts the plaintiffs' argument that Yahoo management's failure to
disclose constituted a misrepresentation that could only harm Yahoo's
valuation, then shareholders are more likely to reap some secondary
liability for unwarranted losses in the Verizon deal. In either event,
the ultimate severity of shareholder losses in the Verizon deal is certain
to affect the shareholders' likelihood of success.
B. The Breach's Effect on the Putative Verizon Acquisition of Yahoo's Core
Business
In early December 2016, Tim Armstrong, the Chief Executive
Officer of AOL, said that he was "cautiously optimistic" that Verizon
would complete its deal to acquire Yahoo's core internet business.m
This statement, however, came after the New York Post reported in
early October 2016 that Verizon was seeking a $1 billion discount off
its original $4.8 billion offer, arguing that the hacking revelations had
diminished Yahoo's value." But the Post report maintained that "the
Yahoo deal team is pushing back hard against any attempts to
negotiate the price down."m Concerning the timing of the putative
acquisition, Armstrong suggested in early December that the
companies would start to work out the potential structure of their
combined businesses in early 2017.93
288. See In re Caremark Int'l, Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. 1996) (framing an
assessment of directors' affirmative actions, such as deciding not to disclose a
cybersecurity breach, and focusing on the process that gave rise to the action rather
than the content of the decision itself).
289. See id. at 967 (explaining that despite the business judgment rule's
deferential standard of review, a director may be subject to liability if the court
determines that the directors' decision-making process was irrational or was not a
good faith effort to advance the company's best interests).
290. Robert Hackett, AOL CEO Tim Armstrong "Optimistic" About Verizon Closing Its
Yahoo Dea4 FORTUNE (Dec. 6, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/06/yahoo-
verizon-aol-ceo-tim-armstrong-optimistic.
291. See Claire Atkinson, Verizon Wants $1B Discount on Yahoo Deal After Reports of
Hacking, Spying, N.Y. PosT (Oct. 6, 2016, 6:02 PM), http://nypost.com/2016/10/06/
verizon-wants-lb-discount-on-yahoo-deal-after-hacking-reports.
292. See id.
293. See Hackett, supra note 290 (suggesting that Armstrong is hopeful that Ms.
Mayer will remain on the executive board throughout the acquisition).
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The disclosure in mid-December 2016 of the earlier, larger breach
may have further complicated Verizon's putative acquisition." After
this most recent revelation, the Wall Street Journal reported that
Verizon and Yahoo were close to an agreement, but the disclosure of
the more recent, and even larger, hack "derailed" those efforts."
Moreover, a Bloomberg report published the day after Yahoo
announced the 2013 hack claimed that Verizon was then exploring a
price cut or even an exit from the acquisition.' The report detailed
that AOL CEO Tim Armstrong spearheaded a team focused on
Yahoo's post-acquisition transition, while another, more isolated,
Verizon group assessed the implications of the breach and Verizon's
options."7 Verizon General Counsel Craig Silliman was charged with
preparing to either terminate the acquisition or renegotiate the sale
at a lower purchase price."
In December 2016, it seemed that whether Verizon chose to go
through with the deal, and at what price, would be largely contingent
upon Verizon's ability to avoid any future legal fallout from the
Yahoo breaches.' Ultimately, however, it appears that Yahoo was
largely victorious in the renegotiation talks: not only did Verizon get
significantly less than a discount of $1 billion, Verizon also agreed to
share future cyberliability costs with the remaining Yahoo entity,
Altaba. How, and why, Verizon agreed to such unfavorable
renegotiated terms is likely to come to light in the coming months.
C. Whether Yahoo Compensation Clawbacks Are in Order
Due to the narrow triggering criteria for initiating a clawback of
Yahoo executives' compensation,' it seems unlikely that Yahoo's board
294. See Perlroth, supra note 179.
295. See McMillan, Knutson & Seetharaman, supra note 4.
296. Scott Moritz & Brian Womack, Verizon Explores Lower Price or Even Exit from
Yahoo Deal, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 15, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-12-15/verizon-weighs-scrapping-yahoo-deal-on-hacking-liability
(reporting that, although Verizon has said the deal still makes sense strategically,
Verizon's General Counsel has placed Yahoo on notice that the security breach will
have a material impact on the acquisition).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. ("Verizon is seeking to have Yahoo assume any lasting responsibility for
the hack damage.").
300. See Yahoo 2015 10-K/A, supra note 246, at 42 (explaining that Yahoo's board
may, at its discretion, decrease incentive awards for executive officers if those officers
set forth an incorrect restatement of Yahoo's financial results).
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will seek to undertake a clawback effort, even under the most dire
factual scenarios Yahoo could confront over the next several months.
Recall that the relevant language of the clawback provision
provides the following:
In the event of a restatement of incorrect Yahoo financial results, . . .
the Board ... [may] seek recovery of the incremental portion of
the incentive awards paid or awarded, whether in cash or equity, to
our executive officers in excess of the awards that would have been
paid or awarded based on the restated financial results."o'
While there is a high likelihood that the SEC will penalize Yahoo in
some way for seemingly misrepresenting the existence of the 2014
data breach in its September 9, 2016 filing, the clawback provision's
specific focus on "incorrect Yahoo financial results" will likely mean
that any clawback effort would be futile. This conclusion is further
bolstered by the provision's language concerning how much
compensation could be clawed back in the event of a restatement of
incorrect financial results: that the executives' compensation would
only be reduced to reflect whatever the corrected financial results
would be.sos In other words, the Company's clawback provision
incudes no punitive measures to disincentivize executives'
nonfeasance or misfeasance; even if initiated, executive
compensation would only be reduced by the amount equivalent to
the executives' unjust enrichment for misrepresenting the
Company's finances."o4
This narrow language should give pause to many institutional
investors. Such exceedingly narrow circumstances for clawing back
compensation-as well as the lack of punitive corrective measures in
the unlikely event that clawbacks are ever initiated-is hardly an
effective means for aligning executives' incentives with the
corporation's best interests. Yahoo itself provides an instructive
example: the Company and its executives are facing a dizzying litany
of enforcement actions, user lawsuits, derivative suits, and the loss of
$350 million in a long-planned acquisition, yet these grave
circumstances are almost certainly insufficient to invoke the
Company's clawback provision.
The announcement of Mayer's voluntary forfeiture of a paltry $14
million in compensation should also give investors pause. Current
301. Id. (emphasis added).
302. See id.; see also Viswanatha & McMillan, supra note 237 (noting that the SEC
has opened an investigation into the timing of Yahoo's disclosure of the breach).
303. See Yahoo 2015 10-K/A, supra note 246, at 42.
304. See id.
1288 [Vol. 66:1231
2017] CORPORATE CYBERSECURILY STANDARD OF CARE
estimates put Mayer's total Yahoo compensation over the past five
years-plus the payout she will receive from the Verizon deal's
closure-at approximately $400 million." Her $14 million forfeiture
thus constitutes less than 4% of her total compensation. The
Company's only remedial actions to date are the resignation of one
senior executive and another senior executive forfeiting less than 4%
of her total compensation. Due to how unlikely forced clawbacks are,
shareholders are unlikely to require Mayer or anyone else return a
significantly more exacting-and, we believe, more appropriate-
amount of compensation.
CONCLUSION: THE CYBERSECURITY STANDARD OF CARE GOING
FORWARD
Although teachable lessons abound, the debacle at Yahoo belies a
more fundamental interplay of competing interests that many
corporate directors and officers face in this day and age: the seeming
zero-sum relationship between security-and thus usability-and
profitability. For a technology company such as Yahoo-where the
number of users and the amount of traffic are closely associated with
the Company's revenue and profit, paired with the additional
pressures facing a company in the midst of attempting a turnaround
at the time of an unprecedented data breach-this relationship
appears all the more stark.
The prospect of increased security measures and their associated
downward pressure on usability (e.g., automatically resetting all users'
passwords in the wake of learning about the breach), as well as
shutting off additional future revenue streams (e.g., instituting end-
to-end encryption would hamper the development of additional
features and their ability to be tailored to individual users), run
diametrically counter to increasing the Company's userbase and,
thus, increased. revenue and profitability.
But viewing the security of companies' electronic features-for
technology and non-technology companies alike-as inversely
correlated with the usability and profitability of those features fails to
capture the entirety of the complex interplay between security and
profitability.o Figure 1 is an illustration of the view Yahoo's senior
management appears to have taken.
305. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., supra notes 189-92 and accompanying text (outlining the stark
differences in Yahoo's and Google's cybersecurity reform strategies following a 2010
1289
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Figure 1: The Zero-Sum Model of Security and Profitability
Security
Figure 2, on the other hand, is closer to the truth.
Figure 2: The Profit-Maximizing Model of Security
0
Security
While Figure 1 depicts a fully zero-sum relationship between
security and profitability, Figure 2 reveals that the inverse
relationship between security and profitability is only half the picture
(i.e., the right half of the curve).
The relationship depicted in Figure 2 may be described as follows:
at the leftmost point on the curve, a company's data security is so
abysmal that not only do few, if any, users trust the company with
their personal information so as to render the profitability of the
security breach by Chinese military hackers that compromised information of both
companies).
1290 [Vol. 66:1231
20171 CORPORATE CYBERSECURITY STANDARD OF CARE
company's electronic features a nullity, the prospect of an
unfavorable judicial determination (for example, in an enforcement
action by the FTC) also hampers any possibility of profits. In other
words, zero security measures result in zero users and, thus, zero
profitability. But, as the company's security improves, an increasing
number of users trust the company with their personal information
and the risk of action by the FTC decreases, both of which contribute
to increased profitability. At some point-essentially, where the
number of users is maximized-increased security measures begin
limiting the usability of the company's electronic features and, thus,
begin decreasing profitability. Taken to an extreme, excessive
security measures may, theoretically, drive usability to the point of
futility, rendering profit nonexistent.
It is important to note that the right half of the curve in Figure 2 is
effectively identical to the relationship depicted in Figure 1: more
security means less profit. The critical takeaway is that little or no
digital security may be just as damaging to a company's financial
health as implementing overly excessive security.
As this area of the law develops and matures in the coming years,
courts, regulators, shareholders, and commentators will increasingly
view the relationship between data security and corporate
profitability as described in Figure 2. Perhaps the most important
implication of embracing the relationship depicted in Figure 2 is that
there is a profit-maximizing amount of security. And, as this view of
the relationship between security and profitability is embraced, there
can be little doubt that the various constituencies of stakeholders will
increasingly expect corporate officers and directors to actively seek
their company's profit-maximizing level of data security. If any good
may come from the debacles at Yahoo, we hope it will be the
advancement and clarification of corporate cybersecurity law.
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